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Analysis
Abstract
The rule of reason articulated by the Supreme Court in 1918 in Chicago Board of Trade has long been the
target of scorn and ridicule by scholars and judges. The rule, which is used to determine the legality of
restraints under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, instructs courts to identify and balance a restraint's competitive
effects - restraints that are net procompetitive are legal. Critics argue that the rule is easy to state but
impossible to apply, as it asks courts to identify the unidentifiable and balance the unbalanceable. Despite the
steady criticism, the rule has remained the exclusive rule of reason approach of the Supreme Court for nearly a
century.
Yet, perhaps in an attempt to improve the test, each of the federal circuits has incorporated the less restrictive
alternative inquiry as an independent and dispositive prong of the rule of reason. Under this newly created
test, a restraint that achieves a net procompetitive benefit - and thus is legal under the Supreme Court
standard - is illegal if the procompetitive benefits could have been attained by a less restrictive alternative.
Surprisingly, the new test has not only avoided much criticism, but has received widespread support from
scholars across the ideological spectrum.
Rather than improve the rule of reason, however, use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry as a dispositive
factor transforms an already difficult analysis into a virtually unworkable multi-tiered balancing adventure. It
adds a new level of confusion and opacity to Section 1 analysis and threatens to change the role of antitrust
law from an ex ante deterrent of net anticompetitive behavior to an ex post regulator of net procompetitive
business decisions.
This Article examines the historical use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry and its emergence in the
modern rule of reason analysis. The Article argues that use of the inquiry in the modern rule of reason is both
theoretically and practically flawed. The Article concludes that proof of less restrictive alternatives should be
used solely as proof of anticompetitive intent, which in turn should only be used as one factor to aid courts in
balancing the competitive effects of a restraint of trade. Such use of the search for less restrictive alternatives is
consistent with nearly one hundred years of Supreme Court precedent and maintains the proper focus of the
antitrust laws on the competitive impact of the restraint.
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INTRODUCTION 
Since its creation in 1918, the rule of reason articulated in Chicago 
Board of Trade1 has been under constant attack.  Referred to as the 
“antitrust equivalent to . . . water torture,”2 the rule, which is the 
primary method for determining the legality of restraints under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act,3 is criticized for, inter alia, 
representing nothing more than a muddled set of platitudes with no 
meaningful standards.4  The test requires courts to identify and 
balance the procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive effects of 
the restraint at issue to determine the restraint’s net competitive 
effect.5  While the purpose of the test—to prohibit net 
anticompetitive conduct—is clear, critics argue that its execution is 
cripplingly obtuse and is akin to the proverbial “search for a needle 
in a haystack.”6  Despite the persistent assaults on the rule and calls 
for its reform, the Supreme Court has not veered from the course it 
set in 1918.7
Yet, while the Supreme Court has adhered to the same rule of 
reason analysis for nearly a century, the circuit courts have 
dramatically changed the test, as each circuit has adopted its own 
version of a less restrictive alternative inquiry as an independent and 
dispositive prong.8  The search for less restrictive alternatives has a 
long and interesting juridical history.  Though more commonly 
associated with constitutional law, the means-oriented less restrictive 
alternative inquiry originated in common law restraint of trade cases 
and was the first rule of reason test in antitrust law.9  While the 
 1. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238–41 (1918). 
 2. In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, 955 F.2d 457, 475–76 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(quotation omitted). 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 4. See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted 
Distribution:  Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 15 (1981) (commenting that the rule 
of reason is “[a] standard so poorly articulated and particularized, applied by 
tribunals so poorly equipped to understand and apply it”). 
 5. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238. 
 6. Panel Discussion, Market Power and Entry Barriers, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 714 
(1989). 
 7. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999) (examining the 
facts of the case using the rule of reason analysis). 
 8. See, e.g., Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that the plaintiff can overcome a showing that the restraint has a net 
procompetitive effect by identifying an alternative means of achieving the same 
effect). 
 9. The classic formulation of the early test is contained in then-Judge Taft’s 
much-lauded decision in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 
(1898).  See Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N. Dahdouh, Information Problems in Merger 
Decision Making and Their Impact on Development of an Efficiencies Defense, 62 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 23, 37 (1993) (discussing the importation of the inquiry from antitrust law to 
constitutional law). 
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inquiry was embraced by the Supreme Court in constitutional law 
jurisprudence, particularly during the civil rights movement, the 
Supreme Court refused to adopt its use in rule of reason cases, opting 
instead for the balancing test in Chicago Board of Trade.10  The inquiry, 
therefore, disappeared entirely from rule of reason jurisprudence for 
nearly half a century, only to gradually reemerge as a distinct part of a 
new rule of reason test. 
Under the new rule of reason test, a restraint that achieves a net 
procompetitive impact—and thus is legal under the Supreme Court 
standard—is illegal if that impact could have been attained by a less 
restrictive alternative.11  Perhaps in an attempt to improve the rule of 
reason analysis, the new test has been adopted by every circuit and 
has received nearly universal approval from scholars across the 
ideological spectrum.12  Rather than add clarity to the rule of reason, 
however, this additional prong adds a new level of confusion and 
opacity to Section 1 analysis and changes the role of antitrust law 
from an ex ante deterrent of net anticompetitive behavior to an ex 
post regulator of net procompetitive business decisions.  If the 
Chicago Board of Trade approach requires courts to search for a needle 
in a haystack, the new rule of reason requires a search for the 
sharpest needle in the haystack.  The new rule threatens to 
undermine antitrust enforcement and is inconsistent with almost one 
hundred years of Supreme Court precedent.  Nevertheless, it has 
managed to avoid serious criticism.  This Article examines the 
theoretical and practical flaws of this new rule of reason and argues 
that the less restrictive alternative inquiry should not be an 
independent and dispositive prong of the rule of reason.  Instead, 
proof of less restrictive alternatives should be used solely as proof of 
intent to aid courts in balancing the competitive effects of a restraint 
of trade. 
This Article will proceed as follows.  Part I provides an overview of 
the evolution of the rule of reason analysis in antitrust law and 
explores the creation, disappearance, and reemergence of the less 
 10. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 
(2007) (overturning the per se rule against vertical price restraints in favor of a rule 
of reason approach because there are occasions when such restraints will have a 
procompetitive effect). 
 11. See, e.g., Clorox, 117 F.3d at 56 (outlining the three part analysis framework as 
the proper way to determine if Lysol trademark agreements produced 
anticompetitive effects and harmed the public). 
 12. See generally Renee Grewe, Antitrust Law and the Less Restrictive Alternatives 
Doctrine:  A Case Study of its Application in the Sports Context, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 227, 231 
(2002) (discussing the rule of reason standards used by different circuits and noting 
their scholarly support). 
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restrictive alternative inquiry.  This section explains how use of the 
inquiry by circuit courts has created a “New Rule of Reason” that is 
fundamentally different from the test first announced by the 
Supreme Court in Chicago Board of Trade.  Part II discusses the 
theoretical flaws of the use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry as 
part of the New Rule of Reason analysis.  Part III examines the 
practical difficulties of the inquiry as part of the New Rule of Reason.  
Part IV explains why the inquiry cannot be used as a heuristic to 
replace the traditional Chicago Board of Trade rule of reason analysis.  
Part V discusses the proper role of the inquiry and provides a more 
workable framework for antitrust analysis of agreements between 
competitors. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE RULE OF REASON AND  
THE LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS 
A. The Original “Rule of Reason” and the Origins of the  
Less Restrictive Alternative Test 
Much of modern antitrust law focuses on the dangers of 
monopolization and agreements among horizontal competitors.  The 
primary fear is that monopolies and horizontal cartels will reduce 
output and raise prices to consumers.  A complex body of antitrust 
law has therefore developed to prevent anticompetitive restraints and 
protect consumer welfare.  This modern approach to antitrust law, 
however, bears little resemblance to its common law origins. 
Prohibitions against restraints of trade began in the fifteenth 
century when judges declared illegal all contracts that prevented a 
person from practicing his profession.13  Most of these cases arose in 
the context of covenants not to compete.14  As the common law 
 13. See, e.g., Lee Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 23, 
23 n.1 (1964) (noting that the public’s need for any available skilled labor due to its 
scarcity necessitated such an approach limiting the restrictions on covenants not to 
compete).  As then-Professor Taft explained: 
It was regarded as against the general interest of freedom of labor and trade 
to enforce a man’s agreement to disable himself to earn his own livelihood, 
and so to become a charge upon the community.  Probably that was the sole 
purpose at first.  Later on the kings exercised the power to grant the 
privilege to individuals of exclusive dealing in particular trades, and they did 
this by patents for monopolies.  Naturally, such an exclusion of all others 
from any particular business or trade by arbitrary royal act stirred the 
indignation of the people, and the abolition of those statutory monopolies 
followed. 
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 7 (1914). 
 14. The first reported case to rule on the validity of a covenant not to compete 
was Dyer’s Case, where the court held that the plaintiff’s restraint was per se illegal, 
concluding “by God, if the plaintiff were here he would go to prison until he paid a 
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developed, courts recognized that some of these restraints should be 
permitted because they were used in support and furtherance of 
legitimate goals.  In order to determine which restraints were 
permissible, or “reasonable,” the courts adapted a form of the less 
restrictive alternative test as part of an early “rule of reason.”15  The 
initial version of this rule was discussed in Mitchel v. Reynolds,16 where 
the court held that a covenant not to compete will be enforced only 
where the restraint is “particular.”17  The test was more fully 
articulated in Horner v. Graves:18
 
fine to the King.”  Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105 
N.E.2d 685, 691 (Ohio C.P. 1952) (quoting Dyer’s Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, fol. 5, Mich., pl. 
26 (1414)).  An Ohio Judge later eloquently explained the reason for the per se 
illegality of the covenants: 
Over five hundred years of colorful history look down on this type of 
litigation. . . .  Skill in a trade was the vital factor in a man’s economic status 
and it was obtainable only through apprenticeship to an experienced 
worker.  The guild system permitted a man to work only in the trade in 
which he was apprenticed.  Membership in a guild was not easily attained.  
Travel was difficult.  Strangers were not welcome.  If a man couldn’t work at 
his trade in his particular locality, he could hardly work at all; might become 
a pauper; and the public would be deprived of a worker at a time when the 
Black Death had made workmen scarce.  In that background when, in 1415, 
the celebrated Dyer’s Case came before Judge Hall (Hull?), he became so 
enraged by an attempt to restrain a dyer from working in a town for just a 
half year that in bad French he cursed the deal void . . . . 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 15. See infra notes 17–33 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of the 
rule of reason test). 
 16. (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 348 (K.B.). 
 17. Id.  The analysis of less restrictive alternatives serves a significant role in 
constitutional law, see infra notes 159–162 and accompanying text, but constitutional 
law borrowed the analysis from antitrust and restraint of trade jurisprudence, see Yao 
& Dahdouh, supra note 9, at 37. 
The first use of the inquiry in United States constitutional law occurred in 1821.  
See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 231 (1821) (limiting the contempt power of 
Congress to “the least possible power adequate to the end proposed”).  The inquiry was later 
used in the nineteenth century to limit the police power of the state.  See, e.g., Lawton 
v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (“To justify the state in thus interposing its 
authority in behalf [sic] of the public, it must appear . . . that the means are 
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose . . . .”).  The inquiry 
now plays a key role in strict scrutiny cases.  See infra notes 159–162 and 
accompanying text. 
German administrative law utilized a similar doctrine to limit the exercise of its 
police power.  The doctrine, referred to as “The Rule of the Mildest Means,” requires 
that “the means least burdensome to the individual affected and to the public must 
be chosen.”  Fritz Morstein Marx, Comparative Administrative Law:  Exercise of Police 
Power, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 266, 289 (1942).  The rule was created, in part, to prevent the 
police “from shooting sparrows with cannon balls.”  Id. at 285 (quotation omitted). 
 18. (1831) 131 Eng. Rep. 284, 287 (K.B.).  The court held that the restriction on 
a dentist’s assistant was unreasonably overbroad because it prevented the assistant 
from practicing within 100 miles of his employer’s town.  Id. at 288.  Given the 
personal nature of the service and the limits on transportation at the time, the court 
had no difficulty in finding that the covenant was more restrictive than necessary.  Id. 
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[W]e do not see how a better test can be applied to the question  
. . . than by considering whether the restraint is such only as to 
afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in favour of 
whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests 
of the public.  Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary 
protection of the party, can be of no benefit to either, it can only 
be oppressive; and if oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law, 
unreasonable.19
This rule of reason was consistently used by courts in England and 
the United States before20 and after21 the passage of the Sherman Act.  
Significantly, not all of these cases involved covenants not to 
compete.  For example, in More v. Bennett,22 the restraint at issue was 
an agreement among Chicago stenographers to fix a schedule of 
prices.23  The court applied the “reasonably necessary” test in striking 
down the agreement.24  And, in Collins v. Locke,25 the court upheld as 
reasonably necessary an agreement among stevedores in a certain 
port to divide up the stevedoring business.26
This rule of reason became the centerpiece of then-Judge Taft’s 
much-lauded27 1898 opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel 
Co.28  In Addyston, Taft synthesized the common law decisions from 
the United States and England and set forth the definitive standard 
 19. Id. at 287. 
 20. See, e.g., Tallis v. Tallis, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 482, 487 (K.B.) (“A covenant . . . 
is not void as being in restraint of trade, unless the restraint appears to be greater 
than the protection of the covenantee can reasonably require.”); Hitchcock v. Coker, 
(1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 167, 173 (K.B.) (“[W]here the restraint of a party from 
carrying on a trade is larger and wider than the protection of the party with whom 
the contract is made can possibly require, such restraint must be considered 
unreasonable in law.”).  For a comprehensive discussion of the early covenant-not-to-
compete cases, see Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 625, 629–46 (1960). 
 21. See, e.g., More v. Bennett, 29 N.E. 888, 891 (Ill. 1892) (explaining that “to be 
valid, [the restraint] must be no more extensive than is reasonably necessary for the 
protection of the vendee in the enjoyment of the business purchased”); Arthur 
Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 691 (Ohio C.P. 
1952) (“Is the restraint reasonable in the sense that it is no greater than necessary to 
protect the employer in some legitimate interest?”). 
 22. 29 N.E. 888, 891 (Ill. 1892). 
 23. Id. at 890. 
 24. Id. at 891. 
 25. (1879) 4 App. Cas. 674 (P.C.). 
 26. Id. at 687. 
 27. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:  A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 26 (1993) (“Indeed, given the time at which it was written, [the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in] Addyston must rank as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, antitrust 
opinions in the history of the law.”). 
 28. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d and modified, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. 
United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1898). 
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for determining the legality of a restraint of trade.29  Taft first drew a 
distinction between naked and ancillary restraints.30  Naked restraints 
had no purpose other than restraining trade and thus were illegal.31  
Ancillary restraints, such as most covenants not to compete, however, 
were incidental and collateral to a legitimate agreement and were 
thus subject to a “rule of reason” analysis (the “Addyston Rule of 
Reason”).32  Under the Addyston Rule of Reason, a restraint was legal 
if “reasonably necessary” for the underlying legitimate agreement to 
exist at all.33  Taft explained that a restraint was reasonably necessary 
if it was “reasonably adapted and limited to the necessary protection 
of a party in carrying out [the underlying agreement.]”34
 29. See id. at 279–82 (noting that prior to the Sherman Act, unreasonable 
restraints of trade were merely unenforceable contracts) (referencing Horner v. 
Graves, (1831) 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B.)). 
 30. Id. at 279–80. 
 31. Id. at 282. 
 32. See, e.g., Peter C. Carstensen, The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust:  The 
Chicago Board of Trade Case and the Meaning of the “Rule of Reason” in Restraint of 
Trade Analysis, in 15 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 62 (Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & 
Victor P. Goldberg ed., 1992) (explaining that an ancillary restraint “functions to 
facilitate, that is, ‘regulates,’ a joint productive effort or other primary transaction 
between the parties.  The term ‘regulation’ . . . implies that a control exists to serve 
some other function or purpose beyond control for its own sake”). 
 33. Addyston, 85 F. at 281.  As President Taft later remarked, the ancillary 
restraints discussed in Addyston were legal: 
because it was said that they were reasonable restraints of trade.  Now, they 
were reasonable not because in a general way the judges thought they would 
not hurt anybody under the particular circumstances, but they were held to 
be reasonable as measured by the lawful purpose of the principal contract to 
which they were subsidiary and ancillary. 
     This gave a definition for judicial guidance.  It laid down the purposes to 
which such a contract must be confined, and it was not open to the criticism 
that it enlarged judicial discretion into legislative action. . . . What I wish to 
insist upon and emphasize as much as I can is that when it is said that a 
contract in restraint of trade was reasonable at common law, it was not a 
contract in which the restraint was the sole or chief object of the contract.  
The restraint was a mere instrument to carry out a different and lawful 
purpose of the main contract. 
TAFT, supra note 13, at 11–12. 
 34. Addyston, 85 F. at 283.  Then-Professor Taft would later give a more detailed 
explanation of the rule: 
If a man had a business and wished to sell it, with its good will, he could get a 
better price if he might lawfully bind himself not to interfere with that 
business which he was selling by engaging in the same business within the 
same territory.  This was in the interest of the purchaser, because he wished 
to secure the benefit of his bargain and make legitimate profit out of it, and 
it was not contrary to the public interest, because it did not affect the public.      
The condition of trade was not changed by the transfer from one to the 
other, and the status quo was maintained by the agreement. 
Of course, if the restraint upon the seller’s going into business was larger in 
its scope than the business which he sold, either in the matter of territory or 
in the character of the business, it was beyond the proper and legitimate 
purpose of such a restraining term of the contract. 
TAFT, supra note 13, at 8–9. 
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The determinative factor in the Addyston Rule of Reason and 
common law rule of reason cases was the same:  a restraint was 
reasonable, and thus legal, if it was narrowly tailored, or no more 
restrictive than necessary to accomplish the legitimate ends of the 
underlying contract.35  This test raised the following question:  “what 
is necessary in the particular instance for the protection of the 
convenantee in his enjoyment of the main contract”?36  Although 
couched in terms of “reasonable necessity,” the test—which would 
later be imported into U.S. constitutional law—was the earliest 
formulation of the less restrictive alternative test.37  That is, the 
restraint was reasonably necessary if no less restrictive alternatives 
were available.38
The Addyston Rule of Reason was thus a means-oriented inquiry 
that ignored the overall competitive impact of the restraint, focusing 
solely on the legitimacy of the underlying agreement and the 
necessity of the restraint ancillary to that agreement.39  Judge Taft had 
 35. See, e.g., Clarence E. Eldridge, A New Interpretation of the Sherman Act, 13 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 10 (1914) (“[T]he restraint imposed must be no greater than was necessary 
to a full consummation of the indispensable main, lawful purpose.”). 
 36. Antitrust Significance of Covenants Not to Compete, 64 MICH. L. REV. 503, 507 
(1966) [hereinafter Covenants]; see also, e.g., Hall Mfg. Co. v. W. Steel & Iron Works, 
227 F. 588, 592 (7th Cir. 1915) (explaining that legality was determined by “whether 
on the facts of the particular case the restraint is greater than is reasonably necessary 
for the protection of the purchaser of the business and good will”). 
 37. See Guy Miller Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due 
Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1463 (1967) (arguing that the Supreme Court has 
abandoned the concept of economic due process through its failure to extend the 
less restrictive alternative principle to economic regulations); Yao & Dahdouh, supra 
note 9, at 37 (discussing the strict application of the least restrictive alternatives test 
used in constitutional law). 
 38. See, e.g., Carstensen, supra note 32, at 66 (noting that the measure of legality 
under a reasonable necessity test is whether less restrictive alternatives exist); Thomas 
E. Kauper, The Sullivan Approach to Horizontal Restraints, 75 CAL. L. REV. 893, 908–09 
n.73 (1987) (explaining that the language in the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Addyston 
may “be read to encompass an examination of less restrictive alternatives”); Stephen 
F. Ross, Network Economic Effects and the Limits of GTE Sylvania’s Efficiency Analysis, 68 
ANTITRUST L.J. 945, 957 (2001) (explaining that the less restrictive alternative analysis 
“dates back to the progenitors of the rule of reason under English common law”); 
Richard S. Wirtz, Purpose and Effect in Sherman Act Conspiracies, 57 WASH. L. REV. 1, 34 
(1981) (observing that “for all practical purposes, it would seem, the criteria for 
‘reasonable necessity’ and ‘least restrictive alternative’ must be the same”); see also, 
e.g., PHILLIP AREEDA, THE “RULE OF REASON” IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:  GENERAL ISSUES 8 
(Federal Judicial Center 1981) (explaining that “one must ask whether there is a less 
restrictive way to accomplish that objective or, stated another way, whether the 
restriction is ‘reasonably necessary’ to achieve it”); Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule 
of Reason:  Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265, 1322 (“A direction to 
enforce only restraints that are no larger than necessary is but another way of saying 
that there are no less restrictive alternatives.”). 
 39. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging:  The Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 296 (1992) (arguing that the “genius” of a means-
oriented test “is that outcomes can be determined at the threshold without the need 
for messy balancing”). 
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cautioned against the use of a cost-benefit analysis or balancing test in 
gauging the reasonableness of a restraint.40  The search for less 
restrictive alternatives thus played an essential normative role in the 
Addyston Rule of Reason, as it served as the only check—other than 
the threshold ancillary/naked distinction—on the 
anticompetitiveness of the restraint.41  Once a restraint was 
determined to have some legitimate or procompetitive purpose, the 
Addyston test was used only to maximize the efficiency of the method 
used to achieve that purpose.  Put another way, the inquiry was used 
to minimize the anticompetitive impact of the restraint.  It was not 
used, and cannot be used, to determine the net effects of a restraint.  
The operative question asked by the test was thus not whether the 
procompetitive benefits of the restraint outweighed its 
anticompetitive effects.  The less restrictive alternative inquiry was not 
used as a proxy or heuristic for net competitive effect.42  The 
identification, analysis, and weighing of procompetitive and 
anticompetitive effects was completely absent from the inquiry.  If a 
 40. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283–84 (6th Cir. 1898), 
aff’d and modified, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1898); see 
also KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW:  ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW 
EVOLUTION 100 (2003) (noting that Taft thought it inappropriate for courts to 
perform a “general cost-benefit reasoning in every case”). 
 41. See, e.g., TAFT, supra note 13, at 20 (“[W]e find that the state of the common 
law when Congress passed the anti-trust statute was that contracts in restraint of 
trade, in so far as they restrained a party to the contract, were void, unless they were 
reasonable in the sense that they were merely ancillary to a main contract which was 
lawful in its purpose, and were reasonably adapted and limited to that purpose.”); 
Blake, supra note 20, at 632 (observing that in “early common law . . . restraints 
incident to the transfer of business interests have always been held valid if reasonably 
tailored to the scope of the transaction”); Eldridge, supra note 35, at 6 (noting that a 
restraint  of trade “is valid and enforceable unless the restraint is greater than 
necessary for the protection of the parties and therefore unreasonable”); Gary R. 
Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust, the Rule of Reason, and the 
Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 1005 (1988) (noting that the pre-
Sherman Act ancillary restraints doctrine “focused only on what in modern antitrust 
parlance would be considered procompetitive effects”); Donald F. Turner, Some 
Reflections on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. ST. B.A. ANTITRUST L. SYMP. 1, 4 (“The salutary 
principle of invalidating arrangements that are more restrictive than necessary was 
one of the great developments of the common law . . . It was indeed the heart of a 
properly applied ancillary restraint doctrine.”).  As Justice Harlan stated in his 
dissent in the Sugar Trust Case: 
[A]n agreement which operates merely in partial restraint of trade is good, 
provided it be not unreasonable, and there be consideration to support it.  
In order that it may not be unreasonable, the restraint imposed must not be larger 
than is required for the necessary protection of the party with whom the contract is 
made. 
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 24 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
 42. See, e.g., Covenants, supra note 36, at 510 (“[T]he sole standard under federal 
law should be whether the restraint is reasonably necessary to protect the main 
transaction.”). 
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less restrictive method were available, the method being used was, by 
definition, unreasonable, regardless of its net effects.43
B. The Sherman Act, Board of Trade Rule of Reason,  
and the Search for Net Effects 
The passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 and it subsequent 
interpretation by the Supreme Court changed the course of antitrust 
jurisprudence.  Though many disagree with the wisdom of the course 
change,44 there is no question that the Sherman Act and its 
subsequent interpretation represented a dramatic shift.45  The Act, 
read literally, condemns “[e]very contract” in restraint of trade, 
requiring the courts to give it shape and meaning.46  Early on, the 
Supreme Court struggled with the task and issued a series of 
confusing and inconsistent opinions, occasionally relying on an 
Addyston-type Rule of Reason.47  A significant shift in antitrust 
jurisprudence occurred in 1911, when the Court broke away from the 
Addyston test and established a new set of rules in Standard Oil Co. v. 
United States48 for determining the legality of a restraint of trade.  This 
new standard focused on the “necessary effect” of the restraint at 
 43. The less restrictive alternative inquiry also became part of contract and 
property jurisprudence.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 187 (1969); 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 515 (1932).  For a detailed discussion of the 
use of the inquiry in these contexts, see Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is 
there a Text in this Class?”  The Conflict between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 619, 624, 639 (2005). 
 44. In 1910, Justice Holmes wrote that “I don’t disguise my belief that the 
Sherman Act is a humbug based on economic ignorance and incompetence,” and 
referred to the Act as “foolish, absurd, and stupid.”  MILTON HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN 
PERSPECTIVE:  THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF RULE AND DISCRETION 13 (1982) 
(quotations omitted).  See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law:  The 
Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1193–94 (1988) (arguing that the 
Court’s decisions involving the rule of reason have been largely silent on its overall 
application). 
 45. See, e.g., William Letwin, The First Decade of the Sherman Act:  Judicial 
Interpretation, 68 YALE L.J. 900, 918 (1959) (noting that the Supreme Court “took the 
explicit position that the Sherman Act went beyond the common law”).  But see 
Carstensen, supra note 32, at 60, 63 (noting that while Chicago Board of Trade 
“suggest[ed] a radical change in direction” in antitrust law, the “decision was but an 
application of the substantive tests of ancillary and reasonably necessity which the 
Court had adumbrated in the prior quarter of a century”). 
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  For a comprehensive early history of the Sherman Act, 
see Letwin, supra note 45. 
 47. See, e.g., Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49–52 
(1912) (relying on precedent other than Addyston, to review a corporation that 
manufactures eighty-five percent of all enameled ironware); Shawnee Compress Co. 
v. Anderson, 209 U.S. 423, 434–35 (1908) (finding, without citation to Addyston, that 
the lease in question was an illegal restraint of trade); see also, e.g., Carstensen, supra 
note 32, at 57 (discussing the use of an Addyston-type functional analysis by the 
Supreme Court from 1895–1918). 
 48. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
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issue.49  Justice White elaborated on the test later that year in United 
States v. American Tobacco Co.,50 holding that the Sherman Act only 
prohibited agreements “which operated to the prejudice of the 
public interests by unduly restricting competition, or unduly 
obstructing the due course of trade, or which, either because of their 
inherent nature or effect, or because of the evident purpose of the 
acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade.”51
In 1918, Justice Brandeis capped the dramatic paradigm shift in 
antitrust law and articulated the classic post-Sherman Act test for 
determining the legality of a restraint under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act in Chicago Board of Trade.52  According to Justice 
Brandeis, the operative question was “whether the restraint imposed 
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes 
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy 
competition.”53  This new rule of reason (the “Board Rule of Reason”) 
reinvented the Section 1 analysis,54 eschewing the less restrictive 
alternative inquiry and embracing a broad, multi-factored balancing 
test.55
Rather than anchoring the test on the necessity of the restraint, the 
Court focused its gaze on the competitive effects of the restraint.56  
 49. Id. at 65. 
 50. 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
 51. Id. at 179.  Justice White first discussed the concept of a rule of reason in his 
dissent in Trans-Missouri.  United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 355 
(1897) (White, J., dissenting). 
 52. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, An Instrumental Theory of Market Power and 
Antitrust Policy, 59 SMU L. REV. 1673, 1683–84 (2006) (providing examples of the 
Court upholding restraints under the rule of reason approach that would have 
constituted per se violations pre-Board). 
 55. Justice Brandeis explained that: 
the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so 
simple a test[] as whether it restrains competition.  Every agreement 
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.  To bind, to restrain, is 
of their very essence.  The true test of legality is whether the restraint 
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes 
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy 
competition.  To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider 
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its 
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the 
restraint and its effect, actual or probable.  The history of the restraint, the 
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the 
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.  This is not 
because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or 
the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret 
facts and to predict consequences. 
Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238. 
 56. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771, 774 (1999) (examining 
the restraint for a “net procompetitive effect” or a “net anticompetitive effect”); Nat’l 
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The Board Rule of Reason seeks to answer a question that Addyston 
did not raise—what is the net competitive effect of the restraint?  The 
Board Rule of Reason, therefore, requires courts to perform a cost-
benefit analysis of the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of a 
restraint.  The crucial question to be answered by Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act is whether the procompetitive benefits of the restraint 
in question outweigh its anticompetitive effects.57  If the restraint is 
net procompetitive—that is, if the market is better off with the 
restraint than without it—it is legal under the Sherman Act.58  Under 
the Board Rule of Reason, there is no difference in legality between 
an agreement that has a net procompetitive impact and an 
agreement that has a greater net procompetitive impact.  They are 
both legal.  A more efficient, or less restrictive alternative, is not 
“more legal.”  The relevant comparison is between the state of the 
market with and without the restraint, not the state of the market 
with the restraint and with a different restraint.  Thus, a restraint is 
only illegal if its anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive 
benefits. 
This new rule of reason was attacked from the moment Justice 
Brandeis penned the opinion and has been the subject of 
unrelenting attack ever since.59  The test has been likened to, inter 
 
Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (stating that “the 
inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one 
that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition”); Reifert v. S. Cent. 
Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 321 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Under the rule of reason, 
[plaintiff] had the burden to demonstrate that [the restraint’s] net effect was anti-
competitive.”); Viazis v. Am. Ass’n of Orthodontists, 314 F.3d 758, 765 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(“If, by contrast, the restraint should be judged according to the rule of reason, its 
net potential for competitive harm must be evaluated by weighing its probable 
anticompetitive effects against any procompetitive benefits.”); Battle v. Lubrizol 
Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 1982) (“[R]ule of reason analysis should be used 
to determine the net effect on the market.”); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 
629 F.2d 1351, 1367 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that the purpose of the rule of reason is 
to “assess . . . the net competitive impact of the practice”). 
 57. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The basic question is whether this, or some other, theoretically 
redeeming [procompetitive benefit] in fact offsets the restrictions’ anticompetitive 
effects . . . .”); see also, e.g., Carstensen, supra note 32, at 11 (explaining that under a 
“consequential analysis . . . [i]f a restraint appears to have a net positive effect, or 
even if it is on balance apparently neutral, then it is desirable or at least not unlawful.  
If it has a net negative effect, it is undesirable”). 
 58. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104–05 (1984) (noting that the 
relevant comparison for the Section 1 analysis is the competitive state of the market 
with and without the restraint in question); see also, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG 
COMPETITORS § 1.2, at 4 (April 2000),available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ 
ftcdojguidelines.pdf (“Rule of reason analysis focuses on the state of competition 
with, as compared to without, the relevant agreement.”). 
 59. Then-Professor Taft stated: 
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alia, “the antitrust equivalent to Chinese water torture,”60 the “most 
curious obiter dictum ever indulged in by the Supreme Court,”61 the 
“Full Monty,”62 and a “blowfish.”63  One of the primary criticisms is 
that the Board Rule of Reason replaced the clear principles of the 
Addyston test with a muddled set of platitudes.64  It added ex ante 
confusion and uncertainty and traded the relative simplicity and 
predictability of the means-oriented Addyston test for an amorphous 
balancing test that requires situation-specific factual inquiries.  The 
test requires courts to identify a variety of poorly defined (or 
undefined), disparate and incommensurate factors, broadly labeled 
 
[T]he phrase “the rule of reason” brought out the condemnation of 
everybody of demagogic tendencies prominent in politics, and evoked from 
statesmen of little general information and less law, proposals to amend the 
statute, “to put teeth” into it, and to eliminate from the power of the court 
the right to use the rule of reason in the construction and application of the 
anti-trust law. 
TAFT, supra note 13, at 94; see Comment, Negotiability and the Renvoi Doctrine, 27 YALE 
L.J. 1046, 1061 (1918) (noting that “[t]he ‘rule of reason’ [was] much 
misunderstood and much criticized when it was first announced”); Editorial, Restraint 
of Trade:  Board of Trade Rule Limiting Hours of Trade, 31 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1156 
(1918) (noting that the test announced in Chicago Board of Trade “may come back to 
give trouble”); see also, e.g., Robert Dishman, Mr. Justice White and the Rule of Reason, 13 
REV. OF POL. 229, 229 (1951) (“The ‘rule of reason’ remains after almost forty years 
the most curious obiter dictum ever indulged in by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.”); Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 54 
ANTITRUST L.J. 893, 913–14 (1985) (“The balancing process inherent in any rule of 
reason analysis . . . at least as currently applied . . . produces a hopeless morass.”); 
Roberts, supra note 41, at 999, 1000 (“In establishing the Rule of Reason, the Court 
made a colossal blunder” because it “interpreted [the language of Section 1] as if 
Congress was either illiterate or stupid for not saying what it intended.”). 
Perhaps the most scathing attack of this approach came from Justice Harlan in his 
dissenting opinion in American Tobacco, seven years before Chicago Board of Trade: 
Let me say, also, that as we all agree that the combination in question was 
illegal under any construction of the anti-trust act, there was not the slightest 
necessity to enter upon an extended argument to show that the act of 
Congress was to be read as if it contained the word ‘unreasonable’ or 
‘undue.’  All that is said in the court’s opinion in support of that view is, I say 
with respect, obiter dicta, pure and simple. 
United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 193 (1911) (Harlan, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
 60. In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, Inc., 955 F.2d 457, 475-476 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(quotation omitted). 
 61. Dishman, supra note 59, at 229. 
 62. Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association:  Not a Quick Look But Not the 
Full Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 521 (2000). 
 63. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE:  PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 
105 (2005). 
 64. See, e.g., HYLTON, supra note 40, at 93–94 (“With one bold stroke, the 
Supreme Court cut the cord connecting then-undeveloped Sherman Act case law to 
its most likely foundation in common law doctrine.”).  But see BORK, supra note 27, at 
34 (arguing that the early Supreme Court opinions addressing the Sherman Act were 
“so thoroughly misunderstood that many people believed the Supreme Court had 
subverted the Sherman Act”). 
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as “procompetitive benefits” and “anticompetitive effects.”65  And, 
given the unyielding disagreement regarding the meaning of 
“competition,” critics of the test argue that notions of procompetitive 
and anticompetitive effects are widely divergent and virtually 
impossible to identify.66
Even if a court is able to identify the procompetitive benefits and 
anticompetitive effects of the agreement, the test gives no real 
guidance as to how these two core values should be balanced and 
weighed.67  There is also general skepticism about the ability of judges 
or juries to balance different competitive effects with any real 
 65. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 59, at 905 (“[E]fficiencies are difficult to 
quantify, and even more difficult to ‘trade off’ against anticompetitive effects.”); 
Willard K. Tom & Chul Pak, Toward a Flexible Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 391, 
393 n.12 (2000) (discussing difficulties in applying the Chicago Board of Trade 
balancing test). 
 66. The various schools of thought hold widely different opinions on the 
definition of competition.  For example, some focus solely on notions of allocative 
efficiency and promotion of consumer welfare.  Others key on concepts of 
distribution of wealth, others put the greatest weight on the existence of “free” 
markets, some still cling to populist ideals.  The only real consensus is that there is no 
consensus regarding the definition of competition and the goals of antitrust law.  See, 
e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason:  A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the 
Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 368 (2000) (explaining Judge Posner’s 
characterization of three competing positions); Kauper, supra note 38, at 896 
(explaining various opposing opinions on the goals of antitrust law).  For more 
detailed discussions of the debate and disagreement regarding the definitions of 
competition, see, e.g., William F. Baxter, who wrote that 
After close to a century of antitrust jurisprudence, a vigorous debate 
continues over the proper means of furthering the original congressional 
goals of competition and free enterprise.  As a result, uncertainty remains 
over the measure against which the social desirability (and hence legality) of 
various types of business conduct should be tested. 
William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common Law” 
Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 671 (1982) (citations omitted). 
 67. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 
2730 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“How easily can courts identify instances in 
which the benefits are likely to outweigh potential harms?  My own answer is, not very 
easily.”); see also, e.g., Arthur, supra note 44, at 1193–94 (noting that the Court has not 
explained what is necessary to establish an anticompetitive effect or a procompetitive 
benefit); Harvey J. Goldschmid, Horizontal Restraints in Antitrust:  Current Treatment 
and Future Needs, 75 CAL. L. REV. 925, 926 (1987) (concluding that the rule of reason 
is “simply unworkable”).  The 1913 Report of the Senate Interstate Commerce 
Committee illustrates the early criticism leveled at the rule of reason: 
It is inconceivable that in a country governed by a written constitution and 
statute law the courts can be permitted to test each restraint of trade by the 
economic standard which the individual members of the court may happen 
to approve . . . .  In the end nine justices of the Supreme Court will be asked 
to say whether the restraint of trade brought about through this combination 
is a due or an undue restraint, and the answer which each justice makes to 
that question will depend upon his individual opinion as an economist or 
sociologist, the conclusion of the court being in substance an act of 
legislation passed by the judicial branch of the Government to fit a particular 
case. 
S. REP. No. 1326, (1913), as reprinted in 49 CONG. REC. 4126, 4129 (1913). 
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accuracy or consistency.68  As Justice Scalia has noted, balancing 
incommensurate values, such as procompetitive benefits and 
anticompetitive effects, is the equivalent of “judging whether a 
particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”69  The test is 
therefore attacked for complicating and elongating the litigation 
process and requiring judges to engage in ex post policymaking 
isolated from any clear ex ante standards. 
The criticisms are summed up well by Professor Hovenkamp: 
Justice Brandeis’s version of the rule of reason created one of the 
most costly procedures in antitrust practice.  Under it courts have 
engaged in unfocused, wide-ranging expeditions into practically 
everything about the business of large firms in order to determine 
whether a challenged practice was unlawful.  Justice Brandeis’s 
celebrated statement never defines what it is that courts are 
supposed to look for.  His distinction between a restraint that 
“merely regulates” or “promotes” competition and those that “may 
suppress or even destroy” it can expand and contract like a 
blowfish, meaning almost anything at all.70
 68. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440–41 (1978) 
(holding that “the behavior proscribed by the [Sherman] Act is often difficult to 
distinguish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and economically justifiable 
business conduct”); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972) 
(noting that “courts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic 
problems”); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 229–30 
n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Weighing [competitive] effects in any direct sense will usually 
be beyond judicial capabilities.”); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 108 
(“Meaningful balancing, which involves placing cardinal values on both sides of a 
scale and determining which is heavier, is virtually never possible.  A court will rarely 
be in a position to compute a number that measures the social cost of any market 
power being exercised, and then another number that measures claimed benefits, 
and net them out.”); Carrier, supra note 38, at 1349 (“Like it or not, balancing is with 
us.  And as long as we do not expect mathematical precision—which, in any event, is 
impossible—balancing is not necessarily a bad thing.”); Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania 
Case:  Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33 (1978) 
(“[T]here is no reliable way in which a balance of this sort can be made.”). 
 69. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 70. HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 105; see also id. at 149 (noting that under the 
Chicago Board of Trade analysis, “one dumps every scrap of information available about 
an industry onto a large table and then tries to sort out the positives and negatives”); 
LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 188 (1977) (remarking 
that the rule of reason analysis “must be referred to the arts rather than the sciences 
of judgment”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12 
(1984) (“Of course judges cannot do what such open-ended formulas require.  When 
everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive.”); Posner, supra note 4, at 15 
(commenting that the rule of reason is “[a] standard so poorly articulated and 
particularized, applied by tribunals so poorly equipped to understand and apply it”); 
Roberts, supra note 41, at 998 (“[I]n 1911 the Supreme Court led antitrust . . . into 
the twilight zone with its announcement of the ‘Rule of Reason’ in Standard 
Oil . . . .”). 
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In short, critics contend that the test asks courts to identify the 
unidentifiable and balance the unbalanceable. 
Much of this criticism, however, at least in terms of the modern 
application of the Board Rule of Reason, may be overstated because 
courts are rarely required to perform a real or precise balancing test 
when applying the rule of reason.  Rather, in nearly all cases, the 
competitive effects are overwhelmingly net pro- or anticompetitive, or 
one of the parties has failed to allege any pro- or anticompetitive 
effects at all.71  Additionally, a weakness of the balancing test may be 
the inability of judges and scholars to agree on the goals of the 
antitrust laws and the meaning of competition.  The real flaw in the 
Board Rule of Reason may be a flaw that is inherent in all of antitrust 
analysis, particularly any analysis that requires a tangible definition of 
competition as well as measurable and observable indicia of 
competitive effects.72
Regardless of the validity and persistence of criticism and calls for 
reform,73 the Supreme Court has yet to veer from the Board Rule of 
 71. The Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 
(2d Cir. 2003), is illustrative of the typical rule of reason case.  In Visa, the court 
invalidated the restraint at issue under the rule of reason after identifying the 
restraint’s anticompetitive effects and noting that there was “no evidence” of 
countervailing procompetitive benefits.  Id. at 243; see also, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. 
FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 940 (7th Cir. 2000) (invaliding a restriction under the rule of 
reason after holding the defendant had not proved that the restriction produced any 
procompetitive benefits). 
As Professor Michael Carrier has comprehensively explained, the overwhelming 
majority of rule of reason cases are disposed of because one side puts forth no 
evidence of valid anticompetitive or procompetitive effects.  Carrier, supra note 38, at 
1322; see also, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 107 (“Hopefully, few cases will 
require real balancing . . . .”); Phillip Areeda, A Second Century of the Rule of Reason, 59 
ANTITRUST L.J. 143, 149 (1990) (“In practice, courts undertake a rough qualitative 
balancing, asking whether any one element stands out as predominant.”); Arthur, 
supra note 66, at 367 (criticizing the balancing test but noting that “courts avoid 
actual balancing”); Pitofsky, supra note 59, at 914 (noting that precise balancing is 
unnecessary in many cases decided under the rule of reason); Lawrence A. Sullivan, 
The Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 CAL. L. REV. 835, 838 (1987) 
(noting that with National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 
(1978), “a real structure was imposed on the undisciplined shopping list—nature of 
the business, history of the restraint, and all the rest—that Justice Brandeis had 
tendered to juries in [Chicago] Board of Trade v. United States.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 71, at 841 (“[M]uch of the disagreement about 
the meaning and significance of particular [antitrust] cases is traceable not to 
differences in either perception or analysis, but to different value choices.”); see also 
supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 73. See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt:  Jettisoning the 
Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263, 271 (1986) (proposing that the 
Chicago Board of Trade rule of reason be replaced with an Addyston-type analysis); 
Donald L. Beschle, “What, Never?  Well, Hardly Ever”:  Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as an 
Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 474–75 (1987) (noting that 
“the indefinite nature of [the rule of reason] . . . has led to persistent calls for more 
precise and stringent rules”). 
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Reason.74  Repeatedly, the Court has made clear that the Board Rule 
of Reason is the proper test and that the role of antitrust law is to act 
as a gatekeeper, ferreting out net anticompetitive activity.  Certain 
categories of agreements are inherently anticompetitive and so likely 
to have a net anticompetitive impact that they are considered per se 
illegal and are condemned without any further analysis.75  For all 
other agreements, the Sherman Act requires courts to apply the Board 
Rule of Reason to determine the net competitive effect of an 
agreement by balancing its pro- and anticompetitive effects.76  If the 
effects of the agreement are net procompetitive, the analysis is over 
and the restraint is legal.77  The “reasonably necessary” test articulated 
in Addyston and the search for less restrictive alternatives disappeared 
from rule of reason analysis, as the inquiry was irrelevant to the 
determination of net competitive effects.  No court even mentioned 
the less restrictive alternative test in the rule of reason context the 
first forty years after Chicago Board of Trade was published in 1918.78  
The test, which served as the foundation of the Addyston Rule of 
Reason and common law restraint of trade jurisprudence, had 
vanished. 
C. Rebirth of the Less Restrictive Alternative Test 
After Chicago Board of Trade, the less restrictive alternative test 
emerged in three different antitrust contexts, none of which provides 
support for its current use by federal circuit courts in the rule of 
reason.  The Supreme Court first used the test as part of the 
determination of the per se illegality of tying arrangements.79  A tying 
 74. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 
(2007); see also, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 n.8 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“The contours of the traditional rule of reason inquiry have remained largely 
unchanged since they were first defined in Chicago Board of Trade v. United 
States . . . .”); BORK, supra note 27, at 43 (Chicago Board of Trade is “often quoted as the 
quintessential expression of the rule of reason”). 
 75. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (explaining that 
the “principle of per se unreasonableness . . . avoids the necessity for an incredibly 
complicated and prolonged economic investigation . . . to determine at large 
whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable—an inquiry so often wholly 
fruitless when undertaken”).
 76. Supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 77. See, e.g., Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2720 (commenting that the rule of reason “is 
designed and used to eliminate anticompetitive transactions from the market”); see 
also discussion supra notes 56–58. 
 78. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).  The one 
exception being Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912).  See 
discussion supra note 47; see also Thomas Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust 
Regulation of Professional Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 928 (1999) (“For nearly eighty 
years, the federal courts neglected Judge Taft’s approach.”). 
 79. Int’l Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); see IBM Corp. v. 
United States, 298 U.S. 131, 138 (1936) (discussing the relevance of less restrictive 
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arrangement is an agreement by a party to sell one product (the 
“tying product”) only on the condition that the buyer also purchases 
a different product (the “tied product”).  Tying violations are an 
anomaly in Sherman Act jurisprudence.  Unlike the traditional 
categories of per se violations—price fixing, group boycotts, and 
horizontal market divisions—tying arrangements are subject to a 
quasi-per se rule.80  Under the traditional per se approach, proof of 
the agreement itself leads to an irrebuttable presumption of illegality, 
under the theory that the given type of agreement—price fixing, 
etc.—is inherently net anticompetitive and thus would always violate 
the rule of reason.  The per se classification merely serves as a judicial 
shortcut. 
The per se test is applied with less rigidity in tying cases, as proof of 
the tying agreement leads only to a rebuttable presumption of 
illegality.  If the defendant can prove both that the tying arrangement 
serves some procompetitive purpose and that the tying arrangement 
is the least restrictive method for achieving the procompetitive 
purpose, the tying arrangement is subject to the traditional Board 
Rule of Reason.81  Otherwise, the tying agreement is per se illegal.82  
As Professor Donald Turner explained in his influential analysis of 
tying violations, “[a] per se rule is clearly justified if . . . the other 
interests can be equally well or nearly as well served by less restrictive 
devices.”83  The less restrictive alternative inquiry is thus to soften and 
provide an exception to the otherwise rigid per se rule, but not as a 
 
alternatives).  One of the first tying cases to explicitly address the less restrictive 
alternative was United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 561 (E.D. Pa. 
1960).  For an early and influential discussion of the less restrictive alternative in 
tying cases, see Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust 
Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50 (1958) [hereinafter Validity] and Donald F. Turner, The 
Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:  Conscious Paralellism and Refusals to Deal, 
75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962). 
 80. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984) (noting that 
“while the Court has spoken of a ‘per se’ rule against tying arrangements, it has also 
recognized that tying may have procompetitive justifications that make it 
inappropriate to condemn without considerable market analysis”). 
 81. See, e.g., Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969) 
(holding that tying arrangements are per se illegal “because [they] generally serve[] 
no legitimate business purpose that cannot be achieved in some less restrictive way”).  
For a comprehensive discussion of the use of less restrictive alternatives in the tying 
analysis, see Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics:  Farewell to the 
Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17–22 (1997). 
 82. See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1349–50 
(9th Cir. 1987) (discussing the relevance of the less restrictive alternative inquiry in 
tying cases); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(determining that specification should be used because it is a less restrictive 
alternative than restraint of trade). 
 83. Turner, Validity, supra note 79, at 59. 
  
2009] THE MISUSE OF THE LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE  579 
                                                          
part of the rule of reason analysis.84  If the tie avoids per se 
condemnation, however, the application of the rule of reason 
remains the same—a court balances the procompetitive benefits and 
anticompetitive effects of a restraint to determine its net effects.85
The inquiry then emerged in the rule of reason context for the 
first time in 1963 in Justice Brennan’s concurrence in White Motor Co. 
v. United States.86  In White Motor, the Supreme Court addressed the 
legality of vertical territorial and customer restrictions.87  In oral 
argument before the Supreme Court, the Government argued for a 
return of the Addyston focus on less restrictive alternatives, claiming 
that territorial and customer restrictions should be illegal per se 
because, inter alia, primary responsibility clauses were less restrictive 
alternatives for achieving the same procompetitive objectives.88  The 
majority rejected the per se illegal characterization of the restrictions 
 84. Proof of the presence of a less restrictive alternative typically indicates that 
the tied sale was forced on the purchaser, and thus is inherently anticompetitive.  See 
id. at 64 (noting that “[s]ince a tying arrangement in the vast majority of cases 
performs no useful function that cannot be performed by less restrictive courses of 
action, it is quite reasonable to presume an illegal purpose, and some power over the 
typing product, from the mere fact that tie-ins were used”). 
 85. The Supreme Court has also allowed a defendant to use the absence of less 
restrictive alternatives to avoid per se condemnation in other antitrust cases.  See, e.g., 
Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1979) (disagreeing with the Court of 
Appeals’ conclusion that blanket licenses are per se illegal). 
 86. 372 U.S. 253, 264 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).  Interestingly, the least 
restrictive alternative test emerged as an integral part of constitutional scrutiny 
during this time period in strict scrutiny cases, particularly in regulations implicating 
civil rights.  See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little 
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).  Justice Brennan authored several of these opinions.  See, 
e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (“Precision of regulation must be 
the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.”); infra 
notes 159–162 and accompanying text. 
 87. In White Motor, the defendant had entered into vertical agreements that, inter 
alia, restricted the geographic areas within which distributors and dealers were 
permitted to sell trucks and parts, restricted the customers to whom distributors and 
dealers were permitted to sell trucks for resale, and fixed the resale price for trucks 
and parts sold by distributors to dealers for retail sale.  White Motor, 372 U.S. at 255–
56. 
 88. Id. at 266–67; see Charles E. Stewart, Jr., Exclusive Franchises and Territorial 
Confinement of Distributors, 22 A.B.A. SEC. OF ANTITRUST L. 33, 41 (1963) (observing 
that the “[g]overnment strongly pressed the contention that the primary 
responsibility arrangement was a less restrictive alternative to territorial confinement, 
and adequately served the legitimate business needs of White [Motor]”).  Three 
years later, Donald Turner, in his role as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the 
Antitrust Division, wrote a short piece for the New York Bar Association where he 
argued on behalf of the government that vertical territorial restrictions should be per 
se illegal, with limited exception, because less restrictive alternatives exist that 
adequately achieve the same legitimate goals.  Turner, supra note 41.  As Turner 
explained, “[M]y tentative view is that territorial restrictions on dealers are more 
restrictive than is necessary to obtain legitimate objectives in all but very limited 
circumstances.  There are ample alternative devices, all less restrictive than territorial 
restraints, whereby a manufacturer can attempt to achieve an efficient, aggressive 
marketing system.”  Id. at 6. 
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because of the uncertainty of the impact of such restraints, and 
ignored the government’s arguments regarding less restrictive 
alternatives.89  Instead, the Court held that the traditional Board Rule 
of Reason should apply to determine the net competitive effects of 
the restraint.90
In his concurrence, however, Justice Brennan argued that the less 
restrictive alternative inquiry was “pertinent” to the rule of reason 
inquiry because the role of the court is not only to determine if the 
defendant has a procompetitive justification for its restraint, “but 
whether the restraint so justified is more restrictive than necessary, or 
excessively anticompetitive, when viewed in light of the extenuating 
interests.”91  Justice Brennan then clarified the significance of the 
proof of less restrictive alternatives:  “its presence invites suspicion 
either that dealer pressures rather than manufacturer interests 
brought it about, or that the real purpose of its adoption was to 
restrict price competition.”92  In other words, as discussed below, the 
inquiry was used to shed light on the intent or purpose of the 
agreement. 
Later that year, in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,93 the Supreme 
Court used the Addyston-style less restrictive alternative inquiry in its 
third different context as part of a very specialized rule of reason to 
determine the application of Section 1 of the Sherman Act to 
federally regulated agencies.94  In Silver, the New York Stock 
Exchange denied non-member brokers access to wire service 
facilities, arguing that federal securities laws provided them with an 
implied, qualified immunity from antitrust scrutiny.95  The Supreme 
Court invalidated the restriction, holding that antitrust immunity is 
“implied only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, 
and even then only to the minimum extent necessary.”96  Courts 
subsequently used the holding in Silver to create a new “rule of 
reason” that incorporated a number of factors, including, inter alia, a 
consideration of whether the regulation at issue was “no more 
extensive than necessary.”97  Use of this rule of reason, however, has 
 89. White Motor, 372 U.S. at 261. 
 90. Id. at 263–64. 
 91. Id. at 271, 270 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 92. Id. at 270 n.9. 
 93. 373 U.S. 341 (1963). 
 94. See id. at 364 (concluding that the actions of the Stock Exchange violated the 
Sherman Act). 
 95. Id. at 344. 
 96. Id. at 357. 
 97. Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1116 
(D. Neb. 1981); see, e.g., Neeld v. Nat’l Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 
1979) (affirming the dismissal of a one-eyed hockey player’s Sherman Act claim 
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been limited to discrete situations where a federal agency is 
statutorily authorized to regulate an industry, thereby making it all 
but disappear.98  Significantly, courts have made clear that the 
additional factors in the Silver test, such as the search for less 
restrictive alternatives, are relevant to the legality of the exercise of 
statutory authority, not to the legality of the restraint under antitrust 
law.99
Soon after the emergence of the less restrictive alternative inquiry 
in these contexts, each of the federal circuits gradually adopted the 
inquiry as an independent and dispositive prong of the rule of 
reason,100 and the new test quickly began to receive widespread 
scholarly support.101  This transformation occurred despite the limited 
 
against the National Hockey League because the primary purpose of the League’s by-
law excluding one-eyed players was safety, rather than anticompetitiveness); Hatley v. 
Am. Quarter Horse Ass’n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1977) (affirming the lower 
court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s antitrust claim by declining to apply a per se rule that 
would have deemed defendant’s refusal to register plaintiff’s colt a group boycott in 
violation of the Sherman Act); Gunter Harz, 511 F. Supp. at 1121  (dismissing the 
antitrust claim of a manufacturer of double-string tennis rackets in part because “the 
temporary freeze on the use of double-strung rackets in sanctioned play was no more 
extensive than necessary to further the legitimate goal of conducting the game in an 
orderly fashion”).  Other factors included the presence of procedural safeguards.  Id. 
at 1116. 
 98. See, e.g., In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading Antitrust Litig., 317 F.3d 134, 147 
(2d Cir. 2003) (describing the limited role of the Silver rule of reason); Behagen v. 
Amateur Basketball Ass’n of the U.S., 884 F.2d 524, 527 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(immunizing the actions of the United States Olympic Committee from antitrust 
scrutiny because they “were clearly within the scope of activity directed by Congress, 
and were necessary to implement Congress’ intent with regard to the governance of 
amateur athletics”). 
 99. For instance, in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing 
Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985), the Court held that 
A plaintiff seeking application of the per se rule must present a threshold case 
that the challenged activity falls into a category likely to have predominantly 
anticompetitive effects.  The mere allegation of a concerted refusal to deal 
does not suffice because not all concerted refusals to deal are predominantly 
anticompetitive.  When the plaintiff challenges expulsion from a joint buying 
cooperative, some showing must be made that the cooperative possesses 
market power or unique access to a business element necessary for effective 
competition. 
Id. at 298. 
 100. See Grewe, supra note 12, at 236–45 (discussing the rule of reason standards 
used by each circuit); Robert Pitofsky, Panel Discussion, Antitrust Counseling in an Era 
of Change:  Conflict Between Enforcement Policy and Case Law, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 50, 59 
(1982) (noting that “[n]inety years of history indicates that [the less restrictive 
alternative] question itself is a part of the rule of reason”); infra notes 106–122 and 
accompanying text (identifying the burden of proof in each circuit). 
 101. See, e.g., AREEDA, supra note 38, at 10 (explaining the benefits of a less 
restrictive alternative over a least restrictive alternative test); Kauper, supra note 38, at 
909 (“Society should not bear the costs of anticompetitive conduct in the name of 
efficiency if it can have the efficiency without the adverse competitive effects.”); 
Pitofsky, supra note 100, at 59 (“There is nothing wrong, in a rule of reason analysis, 
with someone asking whether there is a significantly less restrictive alternative.”); 
Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, and the Antitrust 
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use of the inquiry in Justice Brennan’s White Motor concurrence, the 
narrow application of the Silver doctrine, and the fact that the 
Supreme Court never even suggested veering from the Board Rule of 
Reason and its focus on net competitive effects.  Surprisingly, courts 
and commentators typically incorporated the less restrictive inquiry 
without citation or with just a general citation to White Motor.102  It 
eventually became a standard part of a new rule of reason test (the 
“New Rule of Reason”) used by the lower courts. 
Pursuant to this new rule of reason, courts must apply both the 
Board Rule of Reason and the Addyston Rule of Reason.  First, courts 
apply the balancing test from Board of Trade.  If the procompetitive 
benefits of the restraint outweigh the anticompetitive effects, the 
court must then apply the less restrictive alternative test from 
Addyston.  Under this New Rule of Reason, a restraint can only survive 
if it is net procompetitive and if the procompetitive benefits could not 
have been achieved in a less restrictive manner.103  As the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained, 
establishing a violation of the rule of reason involves three steps.  
First, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the 
challenged action has had an actual adverse effect on competition 
as a whole on the relevant market.  Then, if the plaintiff succeeds, 
the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the pro-competitive 
redeeming virtues of the action.  Should the defendant carry this 
 
Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 519, 525 (1997) (“NCAA also reflects the long tradition in 
antitrust law that proscribes overly restrictive agreements among rivals, even when 
they have legitimate reasons to combine their economic activities.”); Sullivan, supra 
note 71, at 851 (stating that “even if . . . claimed efficiencies are real and significant, 
if they can be substantially obtained by means significantly less threatening to 
competition,” then the restraint violates the rule of reason); Wirtz, supra note 38, at 
32 (concluding that “the public interest lies in securing [procompetitive benefits] at 
the least possible sacrifice.  A restraint that confers certain benefits at the cost of 
unnecessary injury to competition can fairly be said to be, to the extent of that 
unnecessary injury, ‘unreasonable.’”). 
Surprisingly, most discussions of the less restrictive alternative inquiry in the rule 
of reason simply assume that the inquiry is a basic and important part of the test, 
without any real explanation as to how and why it became a part of the test.  See, e.g., 
Martin B. Louis, Vertical Distribution Restraints after Sylvania:  A Postscript and Comment, 
76 MICH. L. REV. 265, 272 n.44 (1977) (“The availability of less restrictive alternatives 
has always been a basic consideration under the rule of reason, as Justice Brennan 
carefully noted in his concurring opinion in White Motor.”). 
 102. See, e.g., John L. Murchison, Jr., Patent Acquisitions and the Antitrust Laws, 45 
TEX. L. REV. 663, 685 (1967) (briefly referencing White Motor in explaining that the 
rule of reason requires a balancing of competitive benefits and an examination of 
less restrictive alternatives). 
 103. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Competitive Price Discrimination:  The Exercise of 
Market Power Without Anticompetitive Effects, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 643, 653 n.30 (2003) 
(“[I]f the defendants had a practical ‘less restrictive alternative’ for achieving the 
procompetitive benefits at less threat of harm to competition, the conduct would be 
found unreasonable regardless of the relative magnitude of the benefits and 
harms.”). 
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burden [of proving that the restraint is net procompetitive], the plaintiff 
must then show that the same pro-competitive effect could be achieved 
through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competition.104
There is no uniformity in the application or even statement of the 
test, either across or within the federal circuits.  Instead, confusion 
and inconsistency permeate the decisions.  The two most significant 
variables in the test are the level of requisite “restrictiveness” and the 
burden of persuasion.  With respect to the burden of persuasion, the 
majority of the circuits place the burden on the plaintiff to prove the 
existence of a less restrictive alternative.105  The U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Seventh Circuit, 
however,  place the burden on the defendant to prove the absence of 
less restrictive alternatives,106 while the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Eleventh and Second Circuits have been inconsistent, placing the 
burden on the defendant in one case and the plaintiff in another.107  
The level of restrictiveness varies from “least restrictive” to 
“reasonably necessary.”108
 104. Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(quotations omitted) (citations and formatting omitted) (emphasis added); see also, 
e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 59, at 913 (“A rule of reason analysis means balancing 
anticompetitive effects against efficiencies and other business justifications, and then 
examining whether comparable efficiencies could have been achieved in a less 
restrictive way.”). 
 105. This burden is best demonstrated by United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 
658 (3d Cir. 1993), which stated that 
[i]f a plaintiff meets his initial burden of adducing adequate evidence of 
market power or actual anti-competitive effects, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to show that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-
competitive objective.  A restraint on competition cannot be justified solely 
on the basis of social welfare concerns.  To rebut, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the 
stated objective. 
Id. at 669 (citation omitted). 
 106. See Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352, 363 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding the 
lower court’s finding that the defendant AMA did not meet its burden of proof); 
Kreuzer v. Am. Acad. of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(concluding that “because the [defendant] has failed to demonstrate that the limited 
practice requirement is the least restrictive method available to achieve the asserted 
goal it is, at this stage of the proceeding, an insufficient justification for a practice 
that in other respects has an anticompetitive potential—albeit minimal”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 107. Compare Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1573 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (noting that defendant may show that the “restraints were reasonably 
necessary to achieve legitimate, pro-competitive purposes”), with Schering-Plough 
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “the plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the stated 
objective”). 
 108. See infra notes 109–122 and accompanying text (comparing the varying 
degrees of proof required by the federal circuits). 
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The D.C. Circuit employs the most extreme version of the test, as 
illustrated in Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology,109 placing 
the burden on the defendant to show that the restraint employed was 
the least restrictive alternative, regardless of the net effects of the 
restraint.110  In Kreuzer, a periodontist brought a Section 1 claim 
against the American Academy of Periodontology’s (“AAP”) “limited 
practice requirement,” which prevented members from performing 
non-periodontic services.111  The district court granted summary 
judgment for the AAP, concluding that the AAP had no 
anticompetitive intent in implementing the restriction.112  The D.C. 
Circuit reversed based on the court’s failure to consider the 
competitive effects of the restraint, and remanded the case, 
instructing the district court to apply the New Rule of Reason.113  The 
D.C. Circuit stated that the defendant had to show that its restriction 
was net procompetitive and that it was the “least restrictive means of 
achieving the desired goal,”114 even where the procompetitive benefits 
of the restriction are clear and the anticompetitive effects are 
minimal.115
The Second Circuit116 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit117 employ a similar test, but shift the burden to the plaintiff to 
 109. 735 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 110. Id. at 1495; see also Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1187–88 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979) (concluding that the draft offered by the defendant was not the least 
restrictive restraint on trade). 
 111. Kreuzer, 735 F.2d at 1482. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1495–96. 
 114. Id. at 1496 (emphasis added). 
 115. Id. at 1494–95. 
 116. See Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(explaining that the plaintiff must first show that the challenged action had an actual 
adverse effect on competition as a whole.  Then, the burden shifts to the defendant 
to show that the action has procompetitive benefit.  If the defendant succeeds, the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the same procompetitive benefit 
could have been achieved through less restrictive means); K.M.B. Warehouse 
Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that 
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff if the defendant can show that the contested 
action has procompetitive benefits).  The Second Circuit has been inconsistent in its 
approach.  In an earlier case, the Second Circuit “agree[d] with the Third Circuit 
that a better charge would be to require that ‘the restraints . . . not exceed the limits 
reasonably necessary to meet the competitive problems’” and suggested that the 
inquiry was not a dispositive factor in the analysis.  Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 303 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. 
Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1320, 1249 (3d Cir. 1975) (emphasis omitted)).  
However, the Second Circuit later held that the defendant had “to come forward 
with proof that any legitimate purposes could not be achieved through less restrictive 
means.”  N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1261 (2d 
Cir. 1982). 
 117. See Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 510–11 (4th Cir. 
2002) (remanding to the district court with instructions to more carefully scrutinize 
the presumption in favor of procompetitive justifications); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. 
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show that the “same pro-competitive effect could be achieved 
through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competition.”118  
While the shift removes the burden from the defendant, the test still 
permits a court to invalidate a restraint if it is not the least restrictive 
alternative available to the defendant.  The Third and Eleventh 
Circuits place the burden on the plaintiff to show that the restraint 
was not “fairly necessary”119 or “not reasonably necessary”120 to 
accomplish the procompetitive benefits.121  The Sixth, Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits all place a more demanding burden on the plaintiff, 
requiring it to show that any legitimate goals can be achieved by the 
defendant in a “substantially less restrictive manner.”122
Regardless of the specific version of the New Rule of Reason, the 
general inquiry marked a dramatic shift in antitrust analysis because 
it reintroduced the narrow tailoring requirement of Addyston into the 
rule of reason.  Under the Board test, a restraint is legal as long as its 
effects are net procompetitive, meaning the market must be better 
off with the restraint than it would have been without the restraint.  
 
Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1041–42 (4th Cir. 1987) (denying 
MBNA’s motions for a directed verdict and judgment because MBNA failed to 
establish that its replacement parts tie-in was the least restrictive method of avoiding 
groundless warranty claims). 
 118. Clorox Co., 117 F.3d at 56 (quoting K.M.B. Warehouse, 61 F.3d at 127).  The 
First and Fifth Circuits have articulated a similar test but do not indicate who bears 
the burden of persuasion.  See Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1103 
(1st Cir. 1994) (“One basic tenet of the rule of reason is that a given restriction is not 
reasonable, that is, its benefits cannot outweigh its harm to competition, if a 
reasonable, less restrictive alternative to the policy exists that would provide the same 
benefits as the current restraint.”); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 
F.2d 934, 945 n.6 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The question whether there exists an alternative 
less destructive of competition than the restrictions imposed by [the defendant] in 
this case is, of course, a proper inquiry under the traditional rule of reason 
analysis.”). 
 119. Am. Motor Inns, 521 F.2d at 1248. 
 120. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005); see also, 
e.g., Maris Distrib. Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 302 F.3d 1207, 1213 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(“Rule of reason analysis requires the plaintiff to prove (1) an anticompetitive effect 
of the defendant’s conduct on the relevant market, and (2) that the conduct has no 
procompetitive benefit or justification.”). 
 121. The Third and Eleventh Circuits assert that their tests do not require proof 
that the restraint was the “least restrictive alternative.”  Am. Motor Inns, 521 F.2d at 
1248. 
 122. Care Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 427 F.3d 1008, 1012 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (quoting Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey 
Club, 325 F.3d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 2003)); Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 
1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996); Flegel v. Christian Hosps. Ne.–Nw., 4 F.3d 682, 688 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (quoting Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991)); 
Barry v. Blue Cross of Cal., 805 F.2d 866, 873 (9th Cir. 1986) (ruling in favor of Blue 
Cross in part because the plaintiffs did not sufficiently demonstrate the existence of a 
viable alternative).  Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of 
Justice only consider procompetitive benefits that could not have been achieved “by 
practical, significantly less restrictive means.”  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 58, § 3.36(b), at 24. 
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Under the new test, a net procompetitive effect is not sufficient.  
Instead, it must be the most123 net procompetitive restraint possible, 
meaning the market must be better off with the restraint than it 
would have been with other restraints.  The New Rule of Reason thus 
requires courts to narrowly tailor conduct that the Board Rule of 
Reason has already determined to be legal.  This approach is both 
theoretically and practically flawed.124
II. THEORETICAL FLAWS OF A DISPOSITIVE LESS RESTRICTIVE 
ALTERNATIVE INQUIRY 
Proponents of the less restrictive alternative test argue that it is 
superior to the Chicago Board of Trade balancing test because it is 
easier to perform, less expensive, and leads to more predictable 
results.125  These arguments, however, lend no support to the New 
Rule of Reason because that test combines both the Board balancing 
test and the less restrictive alternative test.  It is therefore more 
difficult to perform, costlier, and less predictable.  Even if used as the 
exclusive test, however, the search for less restrictive alternatives is 
fundamentally flawed, because it does not answer the basic question 
raised by Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Chicago Board of Trade and every Supreme Court decision that 
follows makes clear that antitrust law requires a determination of the 
net competitive effect of a restraint by comparing the state of 
competition before (or without) the restraint versus after (or with) 
the restraint.126  The purpose of Section 1 and the rule of reason is “to 
form a judgment about the competitive significance of the 
restraint.”127  Thus, the question courts must answer is:  does the 
restraint promote or destroy competition?128  In other words, is the 
restraint net pro- or anticompetitive?  Despite the unrelenting 
criticisms leveled at the Board Rule of Reason over the last century, 
 123. The standard in the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits is, however, at least in 
theory, less demanding.  See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 124. These flaws are amplified with the more extreme variations of the test, such 
as that used by the D.C. Circuit, where the chosen restraint must the “least 
restrictive” alternative or the alternatives must only be slightly less restrictive.  See 
supra notes 108–110 and accompanying text. 
 125. Cf. infra Part IV (explaining the disadvantages of the less restrictive 
alternatives test). 
 126. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984) (explaining that 
the Court’s inquiry is whether the challenged restraint enhances competition); Nat’l 
Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (explaining that the 
rule of reason inquiry focuses directly on a challenged restraint’s impact on 
competition). 
 127. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103 (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692). 
 128. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text (establishing the rule of reason 
test focuses on a restraint’s competitive effect on the market). 
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this underlying question and the basic purpose of the antitrust laws 
has never been modified by the Supreme Court since the inception 
of Chicago Board of Trade in 1918.129
The basic flaw of the use of the less restrictive alternative as an 
additional dispositive prong of the rule of reason is that it changes 
the fundamental purpose of the Section 1 analysis and divorces itself 
from the mission of Chicago Board of Trade by comparing the state of 
competition after (or with) the restraint with the state of competition 
with alternative restraints.  This inquiry may tell us if the challenged 
restraint is more or less efficient than its alternatives, but it does not 
measure the net effect of the restraint and therefore avoids the 
fundamental question raised by the Supreme Court in Chicago Board 
of Trade.130  A restraint that is not as effective as available alternatives 
may be direct evidence of a bad business decision, but it is not 
evidence of net anticompetitive effect. 
The role of antitrust law is not to fix imperfections, but rather to 
ensure a satisfactory level of performance.131  The less restrictive 
alternative inquiry, however, provides an invitation for plaintiffs to 
challenge and courts to examine every business decision made by a 
firm.  Once a court makes a determination of the net competitive 
effect of a restraint, the role of antitrust law is complete.  If the 
restraint is net anticompetitive, it is illegal.  If it is net procompetitive, 
it is legal, and nothing more than a business decision made by a firm 
or group of firms.  Interference by a court after a restraint is 
determined to be net procompetitive is no different and no less 
inappropriate than judicial regulation of any other business 
decision.132  Use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry thus changes 
 129. Bd. Of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (proclaiming 
that “[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely 
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may 
suppress or even destroy competition”). 
 130. Id. 
 131. As one economist has noted: 
The antitrust laws and antitrust enforcement institutions are not designed or 
well suited to identify and ‘fix’ all market imperfections that lead markets to 
depart from textbook models of perfect competition.  Neither the state of 
economic science, nor the capabilities of public and private policy 
enforcement institutions, would make it feasible or desirable for antitrust 
policy to seek to identify a wide range of market imperfections, and 
associated firm behavior and market structures, and then to evaluate each 
case to determine whether some way can be found to improve economic 
efficiency by changing the structure of the market or constraining firm 
behavior. 
Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 95, 98 (Apr. 2002). 
 132. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Parke & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 411 
(1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 2127 S. Ct. 
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the role of Section 1 from an ex ante deterrent of anticompetitive 
behavior to an ex post, ad hoc regulator and micro-manager of 
procompetitive business decisions.133  Putting aside (for a moment) 
the fact that courts are not equipped to second-guess business 
judgments, the inquiry fundamentally changes the rule of reason and 
coverts it from a “satisficing”134 test to a “maximizing” test.  This 
change conflicts with both the basic purpose of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act and notions of judicial efficiency that underlie antitrust 
law. 
A. Maximizing Versus Satisficing 
A maximizing test “selects the best alternative from among all those 
available.”135  The less restrictive alternative inquiry is a quintessential 
 
2705 (2007) (“I think that at least it is safe to say that the most enlightened judicial 
policy is to let people manage their own business in their own way, unless the ground 
for interference is very clear.”) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. 
Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 229 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Once it is clear that 
restraints can only be intended to enhance efficiency rather than to restrict output, 
the degree of restraint is a matter of business rather than legal judgment.”); Foster v. 
Md. State Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 590 F.2d 928, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that 
defendant’s failure to use allegedly less restrictive alternatives was a “legitimate 
exercise of business judgment that is outside the scope of the antitrust laws”).  As 
Professor Bork explained: 
For a court to strike down, for example, a vertical market division on the 
theory that the manufacturer had made a mistake as to the most efficient 
mode of distribution would be equivalent to judicial supervision of any other 
normal business judgment.  The court might as well second-guess 
management’s judgment on assembly line planning, inventory policy, 
product design or any of the other decisions that affect efficiency.  Whatever 
else it is, the Sherman Act is not a device for imposing upon the entire 
economy, or any aspect of the economy’s behavior, a judicial form of public 
utility regulation. 
Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:  Price Fixing and Market 
Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 404 (1965).  Or, as Milton Handler wrote: 
But what about the business man?  Why should he be required to 
experiment with less restrictive (and possibly less effective and less practical) 
alternatives on pain of incurring severe antitrust liability?  Why should he be 
second-guessed by economic theoreticians because he has elected to cope 
with his distribution problems in a business-like manner, selecting the 
arrangements which promise to be most effective from a business point of 
view? 
Milton Handler, Some Misadventures in Antitrust Policymaking—Nineteenth Annual 
Review, 76 YALE L.J. 92, 124 (1966); see also infra note 172 and accompanying text . 
 133. Cf. Bork, supra note 27, at 26 (observing that permitting a reasonable price 
defense in price fixing cases would put courts in the impossible position of “allowing 
cartels but policing their prices and behavior”). 
 134. The concept of a “satisficing” model is attributed to Herbert A. Simon.  The 
model is consistent with the theory of bounded rationality.  Paul Mosley, Towards a 
“Satisficing” Theory of Economic Policy, 86 ECON. J., Mar. 1976, at 59, 60; Herbert A. 
Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM. ECON. REV., Sept. 
1979, at 493 (1979).   
 135. HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR:  A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION xxix (3d ed. 1976). 
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maximizing test because it seeks to achieve the most efficient method 
for accomplishing the procompetitive benefits of a restraint.  As 
discussed above, use of this maximizing test in the Addyston analysis 
was essential because it served as the only check on the 
anticompetitiveness of a restraint.136
A satisficing test, however, “looks for a course of action that is 
satisfactory or ‘good enough,’”137 and only has two outcomes—“good 
enough and not good enough.”138  A satisficing test factors in the costs 
and probability of achieving perfection and settles for a less-than-
ideal outcome.139  Significantly, the sub-optimal result is “satisfactory,” 
or “good enough,” not solely because of the costs of achieving 
perfection, but also because of the recognition—due to incomplete 
or unavailable information and information-processing constraints—
that the optimal result is likely impossible to achieve.140  As one 
scholar has put it, the “difference between satisficing and 
[maximizing] . . . is the difference between searching for the sharpest 
needle in the haystack and searching for a needle that is sharp 
enough for sewing.”141
The Board Rule of Reason is by design, if not necessity, a satisficing 
test because an agreement that is net procompetitive is “good 
enough” while an agreement that is net anticompetitive is “not good 
 136. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining the role that the search 
for the less restrictive alternative played in the Addyston Rule of Reason test when 
determining the legality of the restraint). 
 137. Tom & Pak, supra note 65, at 394. 
 138. Mosley, supra note 134, at 60.  According to Herbert Simon, under the 
satisficing model, a decision maker forms “some aspiration as to how good an 
alternative he should find.  As soon as he discovered an alternative for choice 
meeting his level of aspiration, he would terminate the search and choose that 
alternative.”  Simon, supra note 134, at 503; see also, e.g., SIMON, supra note 135, at 
xxix (noting that some “[e]xamples of satisficing criteria, familiar enough to 
businessmen if unfamiliar to most economists, are ‘share of market,’ ‘ adequate 
profit,’ [and] ‘fair price’”). 
 139. See Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition:  An 
Integrated Approach, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1, 29 (1984) (highlighting that limited options, 
time constraints, or basic routines save individuals deliberation time, leading them to 
choose imperfect but satisfactory options). 
 140. See Simon, supra note 134, at 503 (“[T]he important thing about the . . . 
satisficing theory is that it showed how choice could actually be made with reasonable 
amounts of calculation, and using very incomplete information, without the need of 
performing the impossible—of carrying out [an] optimizing procedure.”); see also, 
e.g., Sullivan, supra note 71, at 865 (“Rationality is bounded and information is often 
costly, asymmetrically distributed, inaccurate, or simply unavailable.”); David Ward, 
The Role of Satisficing in Foraging Theory, 63 OIKOS 312, 313 (1992) (offering the 
analogy, in the ecological context, of a predator searching for prey being forced by 
limited time and information to choose a less-than-ideal hunting strategy). 
 141. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:  Removing 
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1078 (2000). 
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enough.”142  Once the threshold of “good enough” is met, the inquiry 
is over.  The test embeds notions of judicial and administrative 
efficiency and recognizes the limits of antitrust analysis and economic 
theory143 and the costs of complying with a rigid maximizing test.144  
The Board satisficing test does not seek to achieve the most efficient 
or “best” economic outcome or the “perfect” result, because such a 
result is costly to achieve and difficult to identify.  Rather, the test 
only seeks to ensure that the market is better off with the restraint 
than without it.145  The antitrust laws encourage firms to be innovative 
and creative in their quest to survive in competitive markets, so long 
as their creativity and innovation have a net procompetitive impact.146  
Once this satisfactory result is met, the law is willing to sacrifice the 
“perfect” result and its marginal benefits, and any further costs of 
compliance or adjudication are spared. 
The less restrictive alternative test converts the rule of reason into a 
“maximizing” test by seeking to achieve the most efficient result.  
According to this New Rule of Reason, it is no longer enough to show 
that the result of the agreement is “good enough.”  It must be the 
“best” result.  The Board Rule of Reason does not, and was never 
meant to, achieve the “best” result.147  As Judge Bork noted, the rule 
was never intended to require a court to “calibrate degrees of 
reasonable necessity.  That would make the lawfulness of conduct 
turn upon judgments of degrees of efficiency.  There is no logical 
reason why the question of degree should be important.”148  And, 
 142. See Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 49, 85 (2007) (referring to antitrust as a “tipsy” doctrine—“at a certain 
point, the conduct tips suddenly from beneficial to harmful”). 
 143. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text (discussing the challenges 
courts face in attempting to identify and accurately and consistently weigh 
competitive effects). 
 144. See infra notes 192–193 and accompanying text (identifying the increased 
litigation costs to defendants that result from a less restrictive alternative tests 
because of judicial inconsistency). 
 145. Cf. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 
1983) (“[U]nlike economics, law is an administrative system the effects of which 
depend upon the content of the rules and precedents . . . .”). 
 146. See Crane, supra note 142, at 87 (considering the various approaches law firms 
might take in response to a strict rule and the potential consequences of those 
approaches). 
 147. Use of a dispositive less restrictive alternative requirement is also inconsistent 
with the “antitrust injury” doctrine, under which a private plaintiff must prove that its 
injury was “of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.”  Atl. Richfield 
Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) (quotation omitted).  The 
antitrust laws were not designed to prevent agreements that are not optimally 
efficient. 
 148. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 227–28 
(D.C. Cir. 1986). 
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more significantly, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the 
relative levels of efficiency of alternative restraints are irrelevant.149
Under the Board Rule of Reason, if the restraint is net 
procompetitive, it is legal regardless of the possibility of a more 
procompetitive alternative.150  A restraint is illegal because its 
anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive benefits, not 
because there are less restrictive alternatives to achieving those 
benefits.151  Justice O’Connor made this point clear in her 
concurrence in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,152 when 
she explained that “an arrangement [that] has little anticompetitive 
effect and achieves substantial benefits . . . is hardly one that the 
antitrust law should condemn.”153  In such a case, the argument that 
there are less restrictive alternatives “is simply irrelevant.”154
Use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry as a dispositive prong 
changes the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws.  Under 
 149. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.29 (1977) (“Although 
distinctions can be drawn among the frequently used restrictions, we are inclined to 
view them as differences of degree and form.  We are unable to perceive significant 
social gain from channeling transactions into one form or another.” (citation 
omitted)); see also Timothy J. Muris, The New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 859, 
863 (1988) (“The Supreme Court well-summarized the issue in GTE Sylvania, stating 
that antitrust does not exist to organize business in specific ways.”). 
 150. See, e.g., Handler, supra note 132, at 125 (“[T]he legality of a restraint must be 
related to the basic antitrust goal of preserving competition and preventing 
monopoly.  If the restraint promotes and does not suppress competition, it should be 
upheld under the rule of reason despite the availability of less restrictive alternatives.  
This was the wise counsel of Justice Brandeis to which we should adhere.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 151. See Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal 
Arrangements:  Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 
61 ANTITRUST L.J. 579, 618 (1993) (“[T]he existence of an obvious and substantially 
less restrictive alternative may be a factor considered in overall rule of reason 
balancing, but it should not be elevated to a separate stage of analysis nor be 
available as a ‘trump card.’”); cf. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973) 
(“The fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been 
accomplished by ‘less intrusive’ means does not, by itself, render the search 
unreasonable.”). 
 152. 466 U.S. 2 (1984), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 
U.S. 28 (2006). 
 153. Id. at 44 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for 
Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 893, 911 (1985) (noting that the 
use of the less restrictive alternative test to invalidate agreements is inconsistent with 
antitrust law, particularly when the anticompetitive effects of the agreement are 
substantially outweighed by its procompetitive benefits). 
 154. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 44 n.13; cf. Struve, supra note 37, at 1466 
(explaining that if an “administrative regulation is ‘rational,’ the existence of [less 
restrictive alternatives] is virtually immaterial”).  The Board Rule of Reason, of 
course, still requires causation.  That is, the challenged restraint must actually 
achieve or further procompetitive benefits.  A restraint that fails to achieve 
procompetitive benefits might be illegal, not because there are less restrictive 
alternatives, but simply because there is no causal relationship between the restraint 
and the procompetitive benefits of the restraint.  See infra note 317 and 
accompanying text. 
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Chicago Board of Trade and after nearly 100 years of Supreme Court 
precedent, Section 1 of the Sherman Act is intended to act as a 
gateway prohibiting agreements that cause a net anticompetitive 
effect on a market.  The New Rule of Reason, however, uses Section 1 
to prohibit agreements that are not procompetitive enough.155  It 
therefore transforms antitrust into an interventionist law where 
judges are required to second-guess complex business judgments of 
defendants.156
B. Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Other Areas of Law 
Incorporation of the less restrictive alternative test as an additional 
dispositive prong of the rule of reason is also inconsistent with 
virtually every other application of a maximizing, less restrictive 
alternative test in other areas of law.  The maximizing test is used 
where a violation of the law, or an infringement of some fundamental 
right, is permitted to accomplish some other legitimate and 
overriding objective.157  In such cases, the maximizing test is used to 
minimize the violation or infringement and the consequent harm.158  
The key element is that there is an actual violation of the law or 
infringement of rights. 
For example, in U.S. constitutional law, a governmental policy that 
infringes fundamental rights and liberties is subjected to a 
maximizing test, strict scrutiny.159  Any infringement of fundamental 
 155. See Meese, supra note 81, at 73 (explaining that invalidating tying 
arrangements based on the mere existence of a similarly beneficial alternative 
penalizes firms “for failing to benefit society sufficiently”). 
 156. See, e.g., Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 528 F.2d 1230, 1249–50 
(3d Cir. 1975) (expressing concern that the less restrictive alternative test creates 
dual problems of burdening business and  putting courts “in the position of second-
guessing business judgments as to what arrangements would or would not provide 
‘adequate’ protection for legitimate commercial interests”); see also, e.g., Ross, supra 
note 38, at 957 (noting that under the less restrictive alternative inquiry in common 
law restraint of trade cases, “judges carefully reviewed and ‘second-guessed’ the 
defendant if it appeared that the restraint was overly restrictive”). 
 157. The maximizing less restrictive alternative test was necessary in the Addyston 
Rule of Reason because the analysis focused primarily (if not exclusively) on the 
procompetitive benefits of the restraint.  The maximizing requirement thus served as 
the only check on the anticompetitive impact of the restraint.  See supra note 41 and 
accompanying text.  But see Roberts, supra note 41, at 1010 & n.244 (discussing Judge 
Taft’s corollary to the Addyston rule that restrictions should be ancillary to the aims of 
the agreement, not in their strictness, but in their extent). 
 158. Cf. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 
284, 289 (1985) (proposing that the application of a per se rule in the antitrust 
context turns on whether the restraint was unreasonable). 
 159. Such rights include speech, religion, association, etc.  See, e.g., Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2789 (2007) (“It is 
well established that when a governmental policy is subjected to strict scrutiny, the 
government has the burden of proving that racial classifications are narrowly tailored 
measures that further compelling governmental interests.”) (quotation omitted); 
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rights is illegal if a less restrictive alternative was available that “would 
be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the 
statute was enacted to serve.”160  As the Supreme Court has explained, 
the purpose of this test is to ensure that the fundamental right “is 
restricted no further than necessary to achieve the goal, for it is 
important to ensure that legitimate [conduct] is not chilled or 
punished.”161  Notably, use of the strict scrutiny maximizing test 
became a significant part of Supreme Court constitutional 
jurisprudence in the civil rights cases in the 1960s.  Justice Brennan 
authored several of the majority and concurring opinions and made 
clear that a maximizing test—while not appropriate for antitrust 
regulation—was integral for the protection of constitutional rights, as 
the “[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so 
closely touching our most precious freedoms.”162
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) employs a maximizing 
test for similar purposes.  There, the inquiry is used to permit “parties 
to impose . . . restrictive measures inconsistent with the [law] to 
pursue overriding public policy goals to the extent that such 
inconsistencies [are] unavoidable.”163  Parties are allowed to violate 
the law in furtherance of some other (more) important policy, as 
 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (“The term ‘narrowly 
tailored,’ so frequently used in our cases, has acquired a secondary meaning.  More 
specifically, as commentators have indicated, the term may be used to require 
consideration of whether lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have 
been used.”).  For a comprehensive analysis of the less restrictive alternative 
requirement in other areas of law, see generally Struve, supra note 37. 
 160. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665 (2004); see also, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 
S. Ct. at 2789 (noting that strict scrutiny requires an “inquiry into less restrictive 
alternatives”). 
Interestingly, if not ironically, constitutional law borrowed the least restrictive 
alternative test from antitrust jurisprudence.  See supra note 37 and accompanying 
text. 
 161. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666 (2004).  In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), the 
Supreme Court explained, “[t]he breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed 
in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.”  Id. at 488. 
 162. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); see also, e.g., Braunfield v. Brown, 
366 U.S. 599, 612 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(stating that First Amendment freedoms are “susceptible of restriction only to 
prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully 
protect” (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)). 
 163. Alan O. Sykes, The Least Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 405–06 
(2003) (quotation omitted).  Maximizing tests are used for the same purpose in a 
variety of other areas of international law, including, for example, constitutional law 
in Germany (the “mildest means” doctrine) and Switzerland.  See Struve, supra note 
37, at 1464 (acknowledging the West German and Swiss economic less restrictive 
alternative principles); see also, e.g., Sir Basil Markesinis & Jörg Fedtke, The Judge as 
Comparatist, 80 TUL. L. REV. 11, 73 (2005) (“Under German law, limitations such as 
the restrictions imposed by the City of Cape Town regarding billboards would thus 
have to be capable of achieving the legislative or administrative aim (Geeignetheit); 
they would have to be the mildest means by which this aim can be achieved 
(Erforderlichkeit).”). 
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long as less restrictive alternatives are not available.  For example, the 
WTO’s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures permits WTO members to institute regulations designed to 
prevent the spread of diseases, as long as “such measures are not 
more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level 
of phytosanitary protection.”164
This same rationale justifies the use of a maximizing test in Silver v. 
New York Stock Exchange.165  Under Silver, statutorily authorized 
regulations are impliedly immune from antitrust scrutiny, but the 
immunity is “implied only if necessary to make the [regulation] work, 
and even then only to the minimum extent necessary.”166  The 
Supreme Court explained the rationale for applying a maximizing 
test in this unique situation:  “[I]t was the specific need to 
accommodate the important national policy of promoting effective 
exchange self-regulation, tempered by the principle that the 
Sherman Act should be narrowed only to the extent necessary to 
effectuate that policy, that dictated the result in Silver.”167
In all of these cases, the abridgement of a basic right triggers the 
maximizing requirement.  If a law, and the rights protected by that 
law, must be violated to achieve some other goal, the extent of the 
violation should be minimized to the greatest possible extent.168  It is 
not enough to show that the challenged measure achieves the stated 
goal, or that the benefits of the achieved goal outweigh the harm to 
the public.  Instead, when speech, religion, or some other 
fundamental right is at stake, the law demands more than a 
“satisfactory” or “reasonable” result; the means used must be optimal, 
necessary, or the least restrictive.169
The essential characteristics of these tests are that they are used to 
minimize actual harm.  There is, however, no cognizable harm once a 
restraint has been determined to be net procompetitive.  Proof of 
 164. Sykes, supra note 163, at 406 (quotation omitted). 
 165. 373 U.S. 341 (1963); see supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text 
(describing the Silver case and explaining that, although the Court conducted a less 
restrictive alternative test, the Silver rule has been nearly abandoned). 
 166. Silver, 373 U.S. at 357. 
 167. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 
292 (1985).  A similar analysis is used in per se illegality cases, where restrictions that 
would otherwise constitute per se violations of the law are evaluated under the rule 
of reason if the defendant can show that there were no less restrictive alternatives.  
See infra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 168. See, e.g., In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading Antitrust Litig., 317 F.3d 134, 144 
(2d Cir. 2003) (“It is a cardinal principle of construction that repeals by implication 
are not favored.”) (quoting United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)). 
 169. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword:  In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court:  A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24 (1972) (discussing the 
maximizing aspect of strict scrutiny).
  
2009] THE MISUSE OF THE LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE  595 
                                                          
some restraint of trade is not the equivalent of a violation of the 
antitrust laws because all contracts restrain trade in some manner.170  
Chicago Board of Trade and almost 100 years of Supreme Court 
precedent instruct that the antitrust laws are only concerned with a 
restraint when it is net anticompetitive.171  If the restraint is net 
anticompetitive, there is a legally recognized injury, and the restraint 
is illegal.  At that point, no further inquiry is necessary and no 
amount of narrow tailoring can save the violation.  If the restraint is 
net procompetitive, there is no cognizable injury, and it is legal. 
The New Rule of Reason thus fundamentally changes the 
underlying purpose of antitrust law and the role of maximizing tests 
by requiring courts to narrowly tailor agreements that are legal.  In 
the absence of any illegal activity, the New Rule of Reason’s search for 
less restrictive alternatives is an exercise in maximizing efficiency, not 
minimizing harm.  It therefore conflicts with the essential character 
of maximizing tests.  Moreover, it forces courts to second-guess 
legitimate business decisions made by firms and thus violates the 
basic principle articulated by the Supreme Court that a “business 
enterprise should be free to structure itself in ways that serve 
efficiency of control, economy of operations, and other factors 
dictated by business judgment without increasing its exposure to 
antitrust liability.”172
C. Judicial Efficiency 
Use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry as a dispositive prong 
of the rule of reason is also contrary to the notions of administrative 
efficiency and judicial economy that underlie much of antitrust law.173  
 170. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (concluding that, because the 
Sherman Act theoretically blocks all trade contracts, courts must interpret the Act’s 
boundaries); see also Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 289 (stating that the 
agreement in question was a trade restraint “in the sense that every commercial 
agreement restrains trade”). 
 171. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2707–
08 (2007) (stating that the standard rule of reason test for determining a Section 1 
violation distinguishes between an anticompetitive restraint that harms the consumer 
and one that is procompetitive and beneficial to the consumer); Bd. of Trade of Chi. 
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (asserting that the “true test of legality” is a 
determination, using all relevant factors, of whether the restraint “promotes . . . 
or . . . destroy[s] competition”); see also supra Part II.B (describing the development 
of the net effects test). 
 172. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 773 (1984) 
(discussing business structure in the context of intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine). 
 173. See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 71, at 145 (“Trial judges . . . feel burdened by the 
complexity of their antitrust cases.  Out of necessity, they may become ready to 
dispose of more antitrust issues summarily.”); Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV.  226, 270-71, 271 n.180 (1960) 
(noting that judges’ attempts to weigh all relevant factors of complex merger 
  
596 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:561 
                                                                                                                                     
Efficiency arguments are particularly compelling in the antitrust 
context because the laws cover a significant amount of economic 
activity.174  The antitrust laws were designed and interpreted with the 
recognition that it is not feasible for courts to micromanage firms’ 
business practices or identify all inefficiencies in economic behavior.  
For example, courts have long used administrative arguments to 
justify the potential overinclusiveness of per se rules.175  The per se 
test relies on a threshold finding that certain categories of behavior 
are “inherently anticompetitive.”176  Once that threshold is met, the 
antitrust inquiry ends and the agreement is invalidated because of the 
significant probability that the agreement is net anticompetitive.177  
The inquiry is cut short, despite the possibility that the agreement 
may be net procompetitive, because of the limited marginal utility of 
further analysis and the recognition that judicial economy is a 
 
antitrust cases place extreme burdens of time and expense on courts as well as 
litigants, and proposing that greater judicial efficiency could be obtained through 
procedural techniques and stronger judicial management); see also supra Part III.B 
(discussing the use of a maximizing test to achieve a policy objective in cases where a 
fundamental right is infringed rather than in antitrust cases where the goal is to 
ensure that competition is being encouraged). 
 174. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 
75 (1983) (“The costs of applying rules often loom especially large in the 
formulation of standards designed to govern a large volume of disputes.  In these 
situations a desire to minimize litigation costs by using bright-line rules may outweigh 
countervailing considerations.”). 
 175. See, e.g., Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2726 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing that 
“sometimes the likely anticompetitive consequences of a particular practice are so 
serious and the potential justifications so few (or, e.g., so difficult to prove), that courts 
have” resorted to a per se rule) (emphasis added); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. 
Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (“As in every rule of general application, the match 
between the presumed and the actual is imperfect.  For the sake of business certainty 
and litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that 
a fullblown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable.”); see also, e.g., Robert 
Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters:  The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical 
Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1489 (1983) (explaining that per se rules “are practical 
rules of judicial convenience” but noting that, in the antitrust context, per se rules 
are often only applied to conduct with “serious anticompetitive consequences” and 
no business justification). 
Use of per se rules has decreased over time, see, e.g., Beschle, supra note 73, at 475, 
but “the per se rule is alive and well,” James A. Keyte, What It Is And How It Is Being 
Applied:  The “Quick Look” Rule of Reason, 11 ANTITRUST 21, 22 (1997), and the 
Supreme Court has made clear that judicial efficiency arguments are still “part of the 
equation,” Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2718. 
 176. See, e.g., Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768 (“Certain agreements . . . are thought so 
inherently anticompetitive that each is illegal per se without inquiry into the harm it 
has actually caused.”). 
 177. The potential overinclusiveness of per se categorization has led to a gradual 
decline in the use of per se invalidation.  See, e.g., Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2718 (reasoning 
that administrative efficiency does not justify widespread adoption of per se rules and 
“relegat[ing] their use to restraints that are manifestly anticompetitive”) (quotation 
omitted). 
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legitimate goal of antitrust law.178  The finding of illegality is based, at 
least in part, on juridical, not economic reasons—on the recognition 
that the administrative and judicial costs and difficulty of further 
inquiry into certain categories of behavior outweigh the potential 
benefits of the behavior.179  It is always conceivable that the restraint 
may actually be procompetitive, but it is not worth the judicial costs, 
potential errors,180 and the subsequent uncertainty181 to make that 
determination.182  Thus, like other satisficing rules, the antitrust laws 
sacrifice “perfection” for judicial efficiency. 
Efficiency arguments provide a particularly compelling rationale to 
eliminate use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry as an additional 
dispositive prong of the rule of reason.183  It is always conceivable that 
there is a more efficient method for achieving the procompetitive 
impact of a restraint—there is always a sharper needle in the 
haystack.  However,  the marginal utility of identifying and requiring 
use of the less restrictive alternative is outweighed by the costs and 
 178. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 175, at 1489 (recognizing that per se rules can 
assist with “efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws[, which] is a justifiable policy 
goal”). 
 179. See, for example, Justice Marshall’s dissent in United States v. Container Corp. of 
America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969), where he wrote: 
Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness.  They are justified on the 
assumption that the gains from imposition of the rule will far outweigh the 
losses and that significant administrative advantages will result.  In other 
words, the potential competitive harm plus the administrative costs of 
determining in what particular situations the practice may be harmful must 
far outweigh the benefits that may result.  If the potential benefits in the 
aggregate are outweighed to this degree, then they are simply not worth 
identifying in individual cases. 
Id. at 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 180. See, e.g., Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2730 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“One cannot fairly 
expect judges and juries . . . to apply complex economic criteria without making a 
considerable number of mistakes, which themselves may impose serious costs.”). 
 181. See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 
U.S. 284, 293–94 (1985) (remarking that, while “group boycotts” are generally 
considered per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, “[e]xactly what types of 
activity fall within the forbidden category is . . . far from certain”); Pitofsky, supra 
note 175, at 1489 (noting that “there is a virtue in telling businessmen accurately and 
precisely the location of legal limits on business conduct”). 
 182. As Justice Breyer explained, “despite the theoretical possibility of finding 
instances in which [price fixing is] economically justified, the courts have held them 
unlawful per se, concluding that the administrative virtues of simplicity outweigh the 
occasional ‘economic’ loss.”  Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 
234 (1st Cir. 1983); see also, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 104 (“The antitrust 
process is expensive, cumbersome, and not particularly accurate.  We compensate for 
high administrative costs and uncertainties by adopting a variety of presumptions, or 
shortcuts.”). 
 183. Cf. Posner, supra note 4, at 23 (arguing that vertical distribution restrictions 
should be considered per se legal “to lighten the burden on the courts and to lift a 
cloud of debilitating doubt from practices that are usually and perhaps always 
procompetitive”). 
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potential mistakes of identifying that alternative,184 particularly 
because courts have long recognized their inability to determine, with 
any real precision, the procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive 
effects of a restraint.185
In per se illegality cases, “the cost of condemnation is slight”186 
because the court is striking down an agreement that is highly 
unlikely to have any procompetitive benefits, much less a net 
procompetitive effect.  In less restrictive alternative/rule of reason 
cases, the cost of condemnation (or “false positives”) is great because 
the court is striking down an agreement that it has already 
determined to have a net procompetitive effect.187  These costs 
include not only the loss of the benefits of the invalidated agreement, 
but also the loss of the benefits of future net procompetitive 
agreements that are deterred or discouraged by the invalidation.188  
Conversely, the cost of false negatives is low, as the court is merely 
permitting an agreement that is net procompetitive but perhaps not 
as net procompetitive as it could have been.189  In terms of antitrust 
legality, there is no difference between a net competitive agreement 
and a “more” net procompetitive agreement; they are both legal.190
                                                          
 184. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557, 579 (1992) (“Further investigation and greater deliberation are almost always 
possible, but after a point would yield little improvement in the quality of the 
resulting law.”); cf. Posner, supra note 4, at 23 (“The same considerations of judicial 
economy and legal certainty that justify the use of per se rules of illegality in some 
cases justify the use of per se legality in others.”). 
 185. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing the design of antitrust 
laws to avoid judicial micromanaging of business practices); see also, e.g., Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 214 
(1995) (discussing the constraints of time, energy, and money that often yield 
imperfect information processing, and remarking that the errors increase as the 
complexity of the decisions increase). 
 186. Dennis W. Carlton, Robert H. Gertner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, 
Communication Among Competitors:  Game Theory and Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
423, 425 (1997). 
 187. See Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 15 (asserting that, because of the high costs 
of deterring beneficial conduct, courts should not attempt to ensnare all 
questionable but likely beneficial practices to catch very few anticompetitive 
agreements).  Conversely, the cost of permitting the less-than-optimal restraint is low, 
as the market is still better off with than without the restraint.  See supra notes 123–
124 and accompanying text. 
 188. See Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form:  Rules vs. Standards 
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 35 (2000) (“Standards that require adjudicators to judge 
citizens’ actions on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis demand considerable effort on 
the part of citizens who wish to conform to the law in order to avoid sanctions.”). 
 189. See HYLTON, supra note 40, at xv (using economic theory to assert that where 
“the expected costs of false convictions are greater than those of false acquittals,” 
courts should create rules of per se legality). 
 190. See supra notes 134–156 and accompanying text (describing the Board rule of 
reason test as the proper “satisficing” test for antitrust analysis, and arguing that the 
less restrictive alternative maximizing test undermines the goals of antitrust law). 
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Of course, in the per se illegality context, the potential sacrifice of 
legitimate agreements is justified by the savings in judicial economy 
and the avoidance of possible errors.  No such savings are achieved by 
use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry.  Instead, the inquiry is 
necessarily accompanied by tremendous costs to judicial economy 
and possible errors, as courts are required to identify differences in 
net competitive effects between actual and hypothetical restraints.191  
This leads to additional costs for potential defendants as it makes it 
more difficult for them to determine the legal consequences of their 
actions.192  The high costs required by the less restrictive alternative 
test—both in terms of current and future economic impact and 
judicial economy—are thus inconsistent with the notions of judicial 
efficiency underlying much of antitrust law.193
III. PRACTICAL FLAWS OF A DISPOSITIVE LESS RESTRICTIVE 
ALTERNATIVE INQUIRY 
Use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry as a dispositive prong 
of the rule of reason also presents significant practical difficulties in 
analyzing restraints under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The inquiry 
adds multiple levels of complex analysis to an already complicated 
test.  It asks judges to identify with accuracy the relative competitive 
effects of hypothetical restraints when judges already struggle to 
identify the effects of actual restraints.  These difficulties lead to a 
number of significant potential negative effects, including 
unpredictable results, a higher rate of judicial error, increased 
administrative costs, and the deterrence of procompetitive behavior. 
 191. See infra notes 199–207 and accompanying text (explaining the challenges of 
weighing the competitive effects of actual restraints against those of alternative, 
sometimes hypothetical restraints, and arguing that this process increases judicial 
inefficiency and costs); see also, e.g., AREEDA, supra note 38, at 10 (“[T]o require the 
very least restrictive choice might interfere with the legitimate objectives at issue 
without, at the margin, adding that much to competition.”); Diver, supra note 174, at 
72 (“In the absence of clear standards, factfinding and offers of proof will range far 
and wide.  The rule’s audience will expend effort in interpreting the meaning of the 
standard and in making successive elaborations of its meaning in individual cases.”). 
 192. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1983) 
(factoring in the client-advisement difficulties for lawyers considering the risk of 
potential lawsuits surrounding procompetitive business decisions if the court applied 
a less restrictive alternative test).  As Judge Easterbrook has noted, “judicial errors 
that tolerate baleful practices are self-correcting, while erroneous condemnations are 
not.”  Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 3. 
 193. See supra note 182 (highlighting courts’ attempts to adopt per se rules in the 
interest of judicial efficiency to respond to the complexity of antitrust cases). 
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A. Difficulties of Application of the Inquiry 
One of the primary criticisms of the Board Rule of Reason is that it 
added confusion and uncertainty to antitrust analysis by replacing the 
relative ex ante clarity of the means-oriented Addyston test with an 
amorphous multi-factored balancing test.  Critics contend that the 
Board test’s global inquiry provides no meaningful standards and has 
led to expensive, unpredictable, and never-ending litigation.  As then-
Professor Easterbrook argued, the test “puts too many things in 
issue. . . .  Of course judges cannot do what such open-ended 
formulas require.  When everything is relevant, nothing is 
dispositive.”194  Critics also argue that the Board test is flawed because 
judges and juries are unable to identify, measure, or balance with any 
precision the competitive impacts of a restraint.195  If courts cannot 
identify and balance competitive effects with any precision, the 
argument goes, how can they determine the net competitive impact 
of a restraint?196
Proponents of the less restrictive alternative inquiry argue that its 
use avoids much of this complexity and the high costs associated with 
the Board Rule of Reason analysis.197  Professors Lawrence Sullivan 
 194. Frank Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 135, 153, 155 (1984); see also, e.g., Maxwell M. Blecher, The “New Antitrust” as Seen 
by a Plaintiff’s Lawyer, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 45 (1985) (“The increased focus on case 
facts under the rule of reason will . . . increase the uncertainty involved in litigation, 
and this uncertainty will increase the number of cases litigated because parties are 
unsure of what the outcome of a particular case will be.”). 
 195. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770–72, 774 (1999) 
(recognizing, by contrasting the majority’s view with that of the dissent, that judges 
could reasonably reach differing conclusions when determining competitive effects, 
which indicates the difficulty of making this determination precisely and accurately); 
Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 11 (noting that it is “fantastic to suppose” that judges 
can balance economic effects with any precision because even economists would 
likely reach different end results); Easterbrook, supra note 194, at 145 (“For many 
practices, even the most careful economists can say no more than that there are 
possible gains, possible losses . . . .  Often the best anyone can do is offer a menu of 
possibilities, some pro- and some anti-competitive.”).  In fact, most of the “balancing” 
cases in the Rule of Reason analysis thus do not involve any real balancing at all.  See 
Carrier, supra note 38, at 1322–23 (hypothesizing that judges wait for defendants to 
prove the necessity of the restraint); cf. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932) 
(“To make scientific precision a criterion of constitutional power would be to subject 
the state to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our 
government and wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to secure.”); Struve, supra note 37, at 1476 
(stating that “[t]he factual issues suggested by the less-restrictive-alternative principle 
may . . . be too narrowly quantitative or technical for the courts to attempt to resolve 
them”). 
 196. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (outlining judges’ and scholars’ 
concerns of the near-impossibility of the Board test). 
 197. These proponents have relied in part on common law, see Alan J. Meese, Price 
Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 112 n.178 (citing a 
pre-Sherman Act case applying the less restrictive alternative test), and even recent 
Supreme Court decisions, see Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League 
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and Stephen Ross argue that the inquiry can be a useful shortcut, 
particularly when inquiry into market power and economic effects is 
difficult and expensive.198  The New Rule of Reason, however, actually 
exacerbates all of these complications by using the less restrictive 
alternative as an additional, conjunctive and dispositive prong and 
creates a number of new and significant problems. 
First, the New Rule of Reason requires judges to perform multiple 
balancing tests.  The term “less restrictive alternative” is a 
comparative term.  Therefore, courts must initially identify and 
balance the procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive effects of 
the actual restraint in question.199  If the restraint is net 
procompetitive, courts must then determine if any alternatives would 
have achieved the same procompetitive benefits in a less restrictive 
manner.  In order to do this, courts must identify the procompetitive 
benefits and the anticompetitive effects of each of the alternatives 
and then compare them with the benefits and effects of the actual 
restraint. 
These additional comparisons can be extremely difficult, because 
in most cases, plaintiffs will come forward with alternatives that vary 
from the original agreement in terms of the likely procompetitive 
and anticompetitive effects.  That is, some alternatives will be alleged 
to achieve nearly the same benefits, but with decreased 
anticompetitive impact.  Other alternatives will be alleged to achieve 
greater procompetitive benefits but with the same or slightly higher 
anticompetitive effects.  In either situation, or any variation of it, the 
less restrictive alternative inquiry requires the courts to compare the 
 
Contracts with Cable Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463, 489–90 (1990) (highlighting two 
Supreme Court decisions that used a less restrictive alternatives rationale), as support 
for use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry in rule of reason cases.  Reliance on 
pre-Sherman Act common law is misplaced, as the test and theory underlying the 
rule of reason shifted after the Sherman Act.  See supra notes 52–55 and 
accompanying text.  Reliance on Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence is also 
inapposite, as the Supreme Court has only used the less restrictive alternative inquiry 
in determining the per se illegality of restraints, not in the actual application of the 
rule of reason.  See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984) (stating 
that under both per se rules and the rule of reason, the essential question is whether 
the restraint hinders or encourages competition); Bd. of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 
1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1983), aff’d, NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) 
(concluding that because less restrictive means were available, the restraints were per 
se invalid). 
 198. See Ross, supra note 197, at 492–93 (proposing that the presence of a more 
limited alternative can stave off a long and costly examination of defendants’ market 
power); Sullivan, supra note 71, at 851 (calling for an end to judicial inquiry based 
solely on the existence of less competition-threatening measures). 
 199. See supra Part II.B (explaining the passage of the Sherman Act and the 
development of the Board test’s focus on the ultimate competitive effects of the 
restraint in question). 
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net competitive impact of the original restraint with the net 
competitive impact of the alternative restraint.200
Each of the myriad of possible restraints creates a menu of 
differing levels of efficiencies at varying costs.  There is seldom clear 
proof that one alternative is less restrictive and as effective as the 
challenged restraint.  Instead, each of the alternatives typically 
represents a “half-way house,” providing some degree of the benefits 
of the challenged restraint along with some degree of the costs.201  
Courts must therefore perform multiple complex balancing tests, 
comparing the relative competitive benefits of the different restraints 
while identifying and factoring in the added or reduced costs to the 
parties of the restraints.  Even if a court can determine that an 
alternative restraint leads to greater net competitive benefits, it must 
also determine if implementation of the alternative is feasible.  In 
 200. As Justice Marshall explained, the least restrictive alternative test “may sound 
like a mathematical formula.  But legal ‘tests’ do not have the precision of 
mathematical formulas.  The key words emphasize a matter of degree.”  Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972).  A General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”) appellate panel has similarly noted that the determination of whether 
something constitutes a less restrictive alternative “involves in every case a process of 
weighing and balancing a series of factors.”  Sykes, supra note 163, at 408 (quotation 
omitted); see John J. Barceló III, Product Standards to Protect the Local Environment—the 
GATT and the Uruguay Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 755, 770 (1994) (recognizing a “balancing test as inherent in the [least restrictive 
alternative] concept”); Matthew D. Bunker & Emily Erickson, The Jurisprudence of 
Precision:  Contrast Space and Narrow Tailoring in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 259, 266 (2001) (“[T]he very notions of ‘narrowness’ and ‘breadth’ in legal 
analysis are problematic, because although these terms suggest precise measurement 
in the physical world, their looser, more metaphorical usage in the law makes them 
ripe for manipulation and confusion.”); John E. Coons, William H. Clune III & 
Stephen D. Sugarman, Educational Opportunity:  A Workable Test for State Financial 
Structures, 57 CAL. L. REV. 305, 398 (1969) (noting that the least restrictive alternative 
test in constitutional law is a “soft rule of balancing the interests of person against 
those of the state” but conceding that the degree to which an alternative must serve 
the state is “unclear”); Sykes, supra note 163, at 415 (arguing that “a least restrictive 
means test . . . is a crude form of cost-benefit balancing”); Robert M. Bastress, Jr., 
Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication:  An Analysis, A 
Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971, 988 (1974) (advocating a balance 
of interests and burdens when using the less restrictive alternative test when 
analyzing constitutional issues in statutes to avoid overinclusiveness). 
 201. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:  Price Fixing and 
Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 466 (1966) (examining the economic effects of a 
variety of vertical restraints and explaining why the alleged less restrictive alternatives 
“will often be inadequate or even irrelevant”); see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:  FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 
185 (1985) (proposing that a hypothetical less restrictive alternative can ignore 
customer particularities of viable niche markets and thus can be too simplistic); Alan 
J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look:  Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule of Reason, 
68 ANTITRUST L.J. 461, 487 n.109 (2000) (“Less restrictive alternatives, however, are 
very often both less effective and more expensive to administer than an airtight 
exclusive territory.”); Meese, supra note 197, at 168 (observing that “many of the less 
restrictive alternatives posited by courts and scholars are either less effective, more 
expensive to administer, or both”). 
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other words, given the costs of the alternative restraint, could the 
defendant have implemented it?202  These comparisons are not simple 
mathematical calculations based on empirical observations.  Instead, 
they require courts to define and measure competition and levels of 
competitive effect and make judgments that are inherently normative 
and value-laden.203  Each balancing test thus adds another layer of 
complexity to the analysis, and each additional layer increases the ex 
ante uncertainty whether an agreement will be classified ex post as a 
violation of the rule of reason.204
Second, any uncertainty created by the Board balancing test is 
magnified in the New Rule of Reason because judges are asked to 
identify with precision the effects of hypothetical restraints.  As the 
Supreme Court has conceded, “[j]udges often lack the expert 
understanding of industrial market structures and behavior to 
determine with any confidence a practice’s effect on competition.”205  
 202. See, e.g., Isabelle Van Damme, Sixth Annual WTO Conference:  An Overview, 9 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 749, 755 (2006) (discussing the challenges of identifying and 
comparing the costs of alternatives because simple monetary assessments do not 
account for regulatory or value costs); cf. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 688 (2004) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that while a judge or attorney could almost always 
imagine some less drastic alternative legislation, “the budgetary worries and other 
practical parameters” can preclude Congress from implementing it); W. Cole 
Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the Scope of Free Exercise Protection, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
665, 718 (1999) (“A prohibitively expensive approach to furthering the state’s 
interests is not feasible, and, thus, fails to satisfy the least restrictive alternative test 
because it does not qualify as a genuine alternative at all.”); Yao & Dahdouh, supra 
note 9, at 39 (“Some alternatives, while theoretically possible, are not 
practical . . . .”). 
 203. R George Wright has noted that: 
Judicial judgments of relative breadth and narrowness are often in 
themselves richly value-laden.  Narrowness and breadth in the law typically 
involve much more than an incontestable counting or measurement.  
Instead, legal judgments that one rule is narrower than another often 
depend crucially on what should be hair-raisingly controversial normative 
judgments and on deep evaluations that are not remotely akin to 
observations. 
R. George Wright, The Fourteen Faces of Narrowness:  How Courts Legitimize What They Do, 
31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 167, 174 (1997); see also Yao & Dahdouh, supra note 9, at 36 (“[A] 
strict least restrictive alternative test virtually amounts to a normative judgment 
strictly disfavoring consideration of efficiencies and other business justifications.”). 
 204. Russel B. Korobkin noted that: 
Multi-factor balancing tests are less pure and more rule-like than 
requirements of ‘reasonableness’ because they specify ex ante (to a greater or 
lesser degree of specificity) what facts are relevant to the legal 
determination.  They still fall on the ‘standard’ side of the spectrum, 
however, because they do not specify how adjudicators should weight the 
relevant factors.  Consequently, citizens often cannot know with certainty ex 
ante whether a particular action will be classified ex post as within or beyond 
the legal boundaries. 
Korobkin, supra note 188, at 28 (footnote omitted). 
 205. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982); see also 
supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (noting the difficulty that courts and juries 
face in balancing different competitive effects). 
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While the criticism is valid in cases where careful and precise 
balancing is required, precision is not typically a premium because in 
most cases the effects are overwhelmingly (or exclusively) pro- or 
anticompetitive.206  In other words, in most cases courts are not asked 
to perform any real balancing.207
Use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry, however, not only 
requires courts to balance with precision, but requires courts to 
balance with precision the relative competitive impacts of hypothetical 
alternatives.  If courts have trouble identifying and balancing the 
effects of actual restraints that have been implemented, it is 
unrealistic to expect a court to be able to determine the relative pro- 
and anticompetitive effects of hypothetical alternatives.  Judges 
cannot predict, with any confidence (much less any accuracy), the 
likely economic impact of a restraint that was not actually 
implemented.208  There are simply too many variables and too many 
unknowns.  The less restrictive alternative test fails to take into 
account the difficulty of accounting for the impact of exogenous 
events and the inability to prove causation with any precision.209  It is 
nearly impossible to identify accurately the relative economic effect 
of alternative restraints because it is difficult to identify with precision 
the actual economic effects of any restraints—actual or alternative.  
As then-Professor Easterbrook noted, “[i]f it is hard to find what a 
given practice does, it is impossible to determine the difference in 
efficiency between a known practice and some hypothetical 
alternative.”210
Third, each of these problems is compounded by the lack of clarity 
as to what actually constitutes a less restrictive alternative for purposes 
 206. Granted, courts may over- or undervalue pro- or anticompetitive effects to 
avoid any real balancing. 
 207. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing what a typical rule of 
reason case entails). 
 208. See Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox through Tripartite 
Innovation, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1067 (2003) (“Who can know whether a different 
path could have led to the same result?  Not firms that consider the broad array of 
business options and must suffer the consequences of the choice, and certainly not 
courts far removed from such real-world pressures.”); Yao & Dahdouh, supra note 9, 
at 39 (“[W]hile it is difficult enough to prove that an efficiency exists, it is even more 
difficult to show that no other reasonable means of achieving the efficiency (with less 
anticompetitive potential) exists.”). 
 209. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 134, at 502–03 (discussing the limits of choosing 
the optimal alternative). 
 210. Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 9; see, e.g., Areeda, supra note 71, at 146 (noting 
the difficulty of measuring the degree of procompetitive benefits); Posner, supra note 
4, at 19–20 (discussing the difficulty of comparing the procompetitive benefits and 
anticompetitive effects of alternative arrangements). 
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of the New Rule of Reason.211  Is an alternative “less restrictive” only if 
it achieves the same level of procompetitive benefits as the 
challenged restraint but with a lesser anticompetitive impact?  If so, 
how much of a lesser impact is required?212  Or, is an alternative “less 
restrictive” if it achieves greater procompetitive benefits with the 
same level of anticompetitive impact?  If so, how much of a greater 
impact is required?213  Or, is an alternative “less restrictive,” regardless 
of the precise procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive effects, as 
long as its net procompetitive benefits are greater?  Or, as several 
scholars have suggested, is an alternative “less restrictive” if it achieves 
“nearly” the same procompetitive benefits with a lesser 
anticompetitive impact?214
Fourth, most versions of the inquiry place on the defendant the 
impossible burden of proving that it has employed the least restrictive 
method or that the restraint was “necessary.”  While only the D.C. 
 211. See Roberts, supra note 41, at 973 (“Less restrictive in what sense?  Is such an 
alternative one that achieves the exact same type and degree of procompetitive 
benefit while creating less anticompetitive effect?  Is it one where there are fewer pro 
but even fewer anticompetitive effects?”).  Similar concerns arise with the use of the 
less restrictive alternative test in the constitutional law context.  As Matthew D. 
Bunker and Emily Erickson explained: 
This search for less restrictive alternatives also raises a series of complex 
questions:  Must the less restrictive alternative regulation achieve the 
government’s purpose as well as the challenged regulation or will some lesser 
degree of effectiveness suffice?  How much less, exactly?  What if the 
alternative costs more to enforce than the challenged regulation? 
Bunker & Erickson, supra note 200, at 260. 
 212. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 66, at 380 (arguing that a plaintiff must establish 
that “a substantially less restrictive alternative is equally effective at the same cost”); 
Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures:  An Overview, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 
701, 720 (1998) (stating that “obvious and far less restrictive alternatives must be 
shown either infeasible or inadequate”). 
 213. See, e.g., Muris, supra note 149, at 863 (stating that the less restrictive 
“alternative must be clearly preferable”); Phillip Areeda, The Rule of Reason—A 
Catechism on Competition, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 581 (1986) (noting that “there must 
not be a reasonable alternative for accomplishing the objective that restrains 
competition substantially less”) . 
 214. See 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 1602c (2d 
ed. 2004) (“[W]e must ask whether a significantly less restrictive alternative would 
solve the problem nearly as well.”); 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 1912i, 
at (2d ed. 2005) (“[P]laintiff is permitted to show that the same (or nearly the same) 
procompetitive benefits could be achieved by a realistic, less restrictive alternative.”); 
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST:  AN INTEGRATED 
HANDBOOK § 5.4b (2000) (noting that courts should ask whether the less restrictive 
alternative proffered by the plaintiff is “nearly as effective”); Meese, supra note 197, at 
111 (noting that “some scholars have argued that plaintiffs should prevail even if the 
less restrictive alternative is slightly less effective than the restraint under challenge”); 
Sullivan, supra note 71, at 851 (arguing that courts should ask whether legitimate 
objectives “can be substantially obtained” by less restrictive alternatives offered by the 
plaintiff). 
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Circuit explicitly uses a least restrictive alternative test,215 each circuit 
appears to employ a de facto least restrictive alternative test by 
allowing a plaintiff to prevail if it can prove the existence of a less 
restrictive alternative.  After all, the only method that does not have a 
less restrictive alternative is the least restrictive alternative.216
A judge, jury, or plaintiff’s attorney engaged in a post hoc 
evaluation of a restraint can always conceive of an alternative that 
might have had a lesser anticompetitive impact.217  As the Third 
 215. See Kreuzer v. Am. Acad. of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (“[I]t must be shown that the means chosen to achieve that end are the least 
restrictive available.”) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 
1173, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (discussing the least restrictive alternative test with 
regards to the NFL draft). 
 216. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (recognizing 
that a search for less restrictive alternatives requires proof that the means chosen is 
less restrictive than “any alternative means”); see also Carrier, supra note 38, at 1337 
(noting that “courts looking for a less restrictive restraint will, in effect, conduct a 
least-restrictive-alternative analysis”).  Even the Third Circuit, which rejects use of the 
least restrictive test, requires a showing that there are no less restrictive alternatives.  
See Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1248 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(explaining that the least restrictive alternative test is relevant but not 
determinative).  Commentators and judges, specifically relying on Addyston, have 
stated the test in terms of requiring a showing of “necessity,” or the least restrictive 
alternative.  Thus, even the “weakened” tests, in practice, seem to require a showing 
of necessity.  See United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 412, 
431 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that a restriction must be necessary to survive the less 
restrictive alternative test); see also, e.g., Frank A. Camp, Antitrust-Franchising—
Principe v. McDonald’s Corp.—Big Mac Attacks the Chicken Delight Rule, 7 J. CORP. L. 
137, 147–50 (1981) (explaining that the less restrictive alternative requirement 
requires a showing that the restraint was necessary); Stephen F. Ross, Some Outside 
Observations on Overly Restrictive Agreements and the Souths Rugby Case, 12 AUSTRALIAN 
COMP. & CONSUMER L.J. 83, 89 (2004), available at http://www.dsl.psu.edu/ 
faculty/ross/Souths.pdf. (noting that a restraint is unreasonably restrictive if it is 
“unnecessary to ensure an efficient” venture). 
 217. See Areeda, supra note 213, at 581 (“[A] troubling element of the less-
restrictive alternative analysis is where to stop.  If four ventures of five firms would be 
better than one venture of twenty firms, wouldn’t five ventures of four firms each be 
even better and so on?  This is a highly qualitative judgment for which there are no 
clear answers.”); Carrier, supra note 38, at 1337 (noting that a court “can always 
tinker at the margins” to find a less restrictive alternative); Frank H. Easterbrook, On 
Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972, 975 (1986) (arguing that 
a case turning on a defendant’s answering questions about business practices that 
have taken years to develop is difficult because “[s]uch explanations . . . tend to be 
vague, hard to verify, even damning”); Handler, supra note 132, at 124 (“The 
fundamental fallacy in this approach is that, no matter what the restraint, there will 
almost always be a less restrictive alternative, and indeed, further alternatives to each 
alternative ad infinitum.”).  As Gary Roberts noted: 
One can always imagine some other form of intra-enterprise control that 
leaves the subunits with more operational autonomy.  Thus, under this least 
restrictive alternative doctrine, a sports league must constantly manage its 
affairs in fear that the limitations it places on its member clubs in order to 
maximize the league product’s quality or to reduce league production costs 
will, upon arbitrary second-guessing by some antitrust court of a plaintiff’s 
choosing, be found more restrictive than it [sic] might have been. 
Gary R. Roberts, Sports League Restraints on the Labor Market:  The Failure of Stare Decisis, 
47 U. PITT. L. REV. 337, 381–82 n.176 (1986). 
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Circuit explained, the least restrictive alternative “would place an 
undue burden on the ordinary conduct of business.  
Entrepreneurs . . .would then be made guarantors that the 
imaginations of lawyers could not conjure up some method of 
achieving the business purpose in question that would result in a 
somewhat lesser restriction of trade.”218  The futility of the 
defendant’s case is of course exacerbated where courts only require a 
showing that the alternative is “nearly” as effective in achieving 
procompetitive benefits.219
The addition of the less restrictive alternative thus creates 
additional problems that significantly increase the ex ante opacity of 
the rule of reason.  These problems and the difficulty of applying this 
New Rule of Reason may have a number of tangible negative effects.  
First, the increased complexity of the analysis (and decreased clarity) 
will lead to higher administrative costs for the parties and the 
courts.220
 
Scholars and judges have long decried the least restrictive alternative test in 
constitutional law because of the impossible burden it places on defendants.  As 
Justice Breyer stated: 
But the Constitution does not, because it cannot, require the Government to 
disprove the existence of magic solutions, i.e., solutions that, put in general 
terms, will solve any problem less restrictively but with equal effectiveness.  
Otherwise, ‘the undoubted ability of lawyers and judges,’ who are not 
constrained by the budgetary worries and other practical parameters within 
which Congress must operate, ‘to imagine some kind of slightly less drastic or 
restrictive an approach would make it impossible to write laws that deal with 
the harm that called the statute into being.’ 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 688 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting United 
States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 841 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see 
also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686–87 (1985) (“A creative judge engaged 
in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative 
means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished.”); 
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 
SUP. CT. REV. 141, 161 (1997) (“Subjective standards that turn on differences in 
degree, such as a ‘pretty much equally effective alternative’ standard, provide little 
constraint on their face.”). 
 218. Am. Motor Inns, 521 F.2d at 1249; see also, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 153, at 911 
(noting that the less restrictive alternative test “is too demanding since it would place 
joint venture organizers at the hazard that others might come along later and think 
of some method of achieving similar efficiencies in a manner that is somewhat less 
restrictive”). 
 219. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (noting that an alternative can be 
less restrictive if it has “nearly” the same procompetitive benefits).  A less stringent 
construction of the test—one that requires proof that the alternative is “substantially 
less restrictive” or “significantly more procompetitive,” for example—eases the 
burden on the defendant, but still creates uncertainty and invites ad hoc second-
guessing. 
 220. Diver, supra note 174, at 74 (“The cost to both the regulated population and 
enforcement officials of applying a rule tends to increase as the rule’s opacity or 
inaccessibility increases.”). 
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Second, the test is likely to lead to more adjudicatory errors, as the 
less restrictive alternative inquiry increases the number of relevant 
factors and the complexity of the relationship between the factors.221  
With each additional less restrictive alternative offered by a plaintiff, 
the number of relevant variables and factors increases and their 
relative values become more complex and difficult to balance.  The 
inevitable result is a higher rate of judicial error and false positives.222  
The increased occurrence of false positives is significant, as it not only 
eliminates a procompetitive agreement, but also results in treble 
damages.223
The magnitude and frequency of these errors is likely to be 
exacerbated by the well-documented effects of the hindsight bias.224  
According to the hindsight bias, decision makers tend to overestimate 
ex post their ability to predict the ex ante likelihood of the 
occurrence of an event.225  As Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski explained, 
“[t]he research on the hindsight bias shows that people blame others 
 221. Cf. Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and 
Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 295–96 (1960) (noting that errors may increase as 
the number of relevant factors increases). 
 222. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 142, at 87 (arguing that an increase in variables 
results in an increase in adjudicatory errors); Eisenberg, supra note 185, at 214, 216 
(“[I]mperfections in human processing ability increase as decisions become more 
complex and involve more permutations . . . . [H]uman ability to calculate 
consequences, understand implications, and make comparative judgments on 
complex alternatives is limited.”). 
 223. See Einer Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 CAL. L. 
REV. 1177, 1234 n.273 (1992) (noting that treble damages are sometimes dangerous 
because of the threat posed by false positives); Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating 
Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688, 1699 (2005) (warning of the legal 
uncertainty that can result from false positives that cause inappropriate treble 
damage awards). 
 224. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 571, 576, 587 (1998) (noting both that the “[r]esearch by cognitive 
psychologists has shown that the folk wisdom on hindsight is correct—past events 
seem more predictable than they really were,” and that the bias is “large enough to 
have an important impact on the legal system and has been shown to affect the two 
kinds of decisionmakers upon which the legal system relies—groups (juries) and 
experienced decisionmakers (judges)”) (footnote omitted). 
 225. As Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich noted: 
The hindsight bias is the well-documented tendency to overestimate the 
predictability of past events.  The bias arises from an intuitive sense that the 
outcome that actually happened must have been inevitable.  People allow 
their knowledge to influence their sense of what would have been 
predictable.  Because judges usually evaluate events after the fact, they are 
vulnerable to the hindsight bias. 
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:  How 
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 24 (2007) (footnotes omitted); see also, e.g., 
Korobkin, supra note 188, at 48–49 (discussing the hindsight bias at length); 
Rachlinski, supra note 224, at 572 (“The bias, in general, makes defendants appear 
more culpable than they really are.  The bias can cause judges and juries to find 
liable even those defendants who attempted to avoid negligence by undertaking all 
reasonable precautions in foresight.”). 
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for failing to have predicted adverse outcomes that could not have 
been predicted.”226  The bias is more pronounced when, as here, the 
law provides a vague ex ante standard and requires an ex post, fact-
specific inquiry.227  The bias has been found to be particularly 
problematic in tort law where judges are asked to make ex post 
determinations regarding the ex ante standard of care taken by the 
defendant.228  The search for less restrictive alternatives presents the 
very same problems, as the inquiry requires courts to determine if the 
defendant could have chosen a less restrictive method to achieve its 
procompetitive purposes.229  The impact of the bias and the 
likelihood of errors are compounded here because of the ex ante 
difficulty—for the parties themselves and for third parties—of 
predicting the economic impact, or relative economic impact, of the 
various restraints available to the parties.230
Third, the New Rule of Reason has the potential of overdeterring 
beneficial behavior, as the ex ante uncertainty and risk presented by 
the less restrictive alternative inquiry (and its higher rate of error) 
may cause some parties to refrain from otherwise beneficial and net 
procompetitive conduct.231  Conversely, because the opaqueness of 
 226. Rachlinski, supra note 224, at 588. 
 227. See Korobkin, supra note 188, at 48 (noting that the bias is “especially 
problematic when a legal standard requires citizens to take only actions that are 
‘reasonable’ at the time”).  Although these criticisms are applicable to the Board Rule 
of Reason, they are compounded by the multitude of additional factors that must be 
considered under the New Rule of Reason. 
 228. Rachlinski, supra note 224, at 595 (“Even in circumstances in which the bias 
affects both sides of a lawsuit, it is still a powerful force in litigation.  Legal judgments 
made under objective standards are, therefore, probably tainted by the hindsight 
bias, thereby resulting in incorrect judgments of liability.”). 
 229. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 208, at 1067 (in determining the presence of less 
restrictive alternatives, “the timing of the actors’ decisions is telling:  a company 
decides in advance whether a particular activity will achieve its objectives; a court 
looks backward after the fact and after the success of the activity (or lack thereof) is 
apparent”); Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American 
Antitrust Policy, 75 CAL. L. REV 797, 802 (1987) (noting that the inquiry asks courts to 
determine if the “alternative was fairly obvious at the time of the agreement and 
would have achieved the legitimate objective as effectively and economically”); Jack 
R. Hlustik, Note, The Effect of White Motor Co. on Exclusive Selling Arrangements, 17 
VAND. L. REV. 549, 555 (1964) (“It is quite easy to look back and ascertain the effect 
of the alternatives; it is another matter to predict the competitive effect of numerous 
alternatives with the ‘penalty’ for the wrong guess being governmental 
intervention.”). 
 230. See Victor P. Goldberg, The Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions:  A 
Relational Perspective, 58 TEX. L. REV. 91, 111 (1979) (noting that parties have difficulty 
predicting the economic effects of their business decisions). 
 231. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 
2718 (2007) (noting that striking down procompetitive restraints “can increase the 
total cost of the antitrust system by prohibiting procompetitive conduct the antitrust 
laws should encourage” and “may increase litigation costs by promoting frivolous 
suits against legitimate practices”); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 
441 (1978) (explaining the danger of firms choosing to be “excessively cautious in 
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the rule makes it difficult for a party to conform (or know how to 
conform) its conduct to the law, it could underdeter anticompetitive 
conduct.232  In other words, the unpredictability of the ad hoc, post 
hoc inquiry does not properly incentivize procompetitive behavior or 
provide disincentives to anticompetitive behavior.233  Finally, the 
additional ex ante uncertainty engendered by the New Rule of 
Reason is also likely to discourage settlements, as economic models 
suggest that settlements are less likely to occur when the outcome of 
the litigation is difficult to predict.234
B. Application of the Inquiry to Vertical Restraints 
Antitrust law’s struggle to deal with vertical restraints provides a 
helpful framework for illustrating the difficulty of applying the less 
restrictive alternative inquiry as an additional prong of the rule of 
reason.  Vertical restraints are restrictions imposed by agreement 
among firms at different stages of the distribution chain, such as 
contracts between a manufacturer and a dealer.235  These restrictions 
are designed to make distribution of the product more efficient and 
typically reduce intrabrand236 competition to increase interbrand237 
competition.  Courts have long had trouble discerning the 
anticompetitive effects, procompetitive benefits, and net competitive 
effects of vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance schemes, 
 
the face of uncertainty regarding possible exposure” to liability under the antitrust 
laws); Tom & Pak, supra note 65, at 400 (discussing the overdeterrent effect of 
uncertain rules). 
 232. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 188, at 36 (discussing the possible 
overinclusiveness of rules); Tom & Pak, supra note 65, at 400 (noting the potential 
underdeterrent effect of uncertain rules). 
 233. See Crane, supra note 142, at 85 (arguing that predictability is necessary to 
incentivize appropriate behavior). 
 234. As Russell B. Korobkin stated: 
The ex ante certainty that rules provide should encourage more disputes to 
settle out of court and not require adjudication at all.  The economic model 
of litigation predicts that litigants will bear the high private costs of seeking 
adjudication only if they have different predictions about the likely outcome 
of adjudication . . . . 
Korobkin, supra note 188, at 32 (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., Frank H. 
Easterbrook, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust 
Defendants:  A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & ECON. 331, 353–64 (1980) 
(discussing the settlement process in antitrust cases). 
 235. See, e.g., Barbara Ann White, Black and White Thinking in the Gray Areas of 
Antitrust:  The Dismantling of Vertical Restraints Regulation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7–8 
(1991) (noting that “[v]ertical restraints are restrictions imposed by manufacturers 
in governing the conduct of the distributors of their products”). 
 236. Competition within the same brand. 
 237. Competition between two or more different brands. 
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exclusive territories, area of primary responsibility clauses, long-term 
contracts, tie-ins, and other related restrictions.238
For almost 100 years, starting with its 1911 decision in Dr. Miles 
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,239 the Supreme Court declared 
that it was per se illegal for a manufacturer and its distributor to 
agree on a minimum resale price for the manufacturer’s good.240  In 
2007, the Supreme Court finally overruled Dr. Miles in Leegin Creative 
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,241 and held that vertical minimum 
price restraints may have significant procompetitive benefits and thus 
are to be judged under the rule of reason.242  In overruling Dr. Miles, 
the Court discussed the different possible procompetitive benefits of 
resale price maintenance agreements:  stimulation of interbrand 
competition, increase in distributional efficiency, incentive for 
retailers to invest in and carry the product, prevention of free riding, 
facilitation of market entry for new brands, and increase in choices 
for consumers.243  The Court also discussed some of the possible 
anticompetitive effects:  facilitation of manufacturer or retailer 
cartels, reduction in innovation, reduction of intrabrand 
competition, and barrier to entry of new competitors.244  As the 
dissent explained, “[t]he upshot is, as many economists suggest, 
sometimes resale price maintenance can prove harmful; sometimes it 
can bring benefits.”245
This is true for each of the different types of vertical restraints, 
which has the potential to achieve similar but varying levels of 
procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive effects.  The extent of 
the benefits and harm—and thus the net competitive impact—varies 
 238. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51–52 (1977) (“The 
market impact of vertical restrictions is complex because of their potential for a 
simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand 
competition.”) (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., Eugene F. Zelek, Jr., Louis W. Stern 
& Thomas W. Dunfee, A Rule of Reason Decision Model After Sylvania, 68 CAL. L. REV. 
13, 18–23 (1980) (discussing the complexity of the competitive effects of customer 
and territorial restrictions). 
 239. 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, 
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). 
 240. See id. at 406–07 (holding that such agreements are void because they hurt 
the public interest). 
 241. 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). 
 242. See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2725 (“Vertical price restraints are to be judged 
according to the rule of reason.”). 
 243. Id. at 2715–16. 
 244. Id. at 2717. 
 245. Id. at 2729 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 6 
(“Economists have developed procompetitive explanations for all of these [vertical 
agreement] practices, sometimes several explanations for each practice.”). 
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from case to case and from restraint to restraint.246  The competitive 
effects of the restraint can fluctuate based on, inter alia, the business 
need for the restraint, the nature of the industry, the characteristics 
of the manufacturer and dealers, the relationship between the 
manufacturer and the dealers, and the relative preferences of the 
consumers.247  The actual economic effects of each restraint are often 
difficult, if not impossible, to measure or identify with any precision.  
Each of the restraints is likely to have disparate economic impacts not 
only across different industries, but also within one industry, and 
even within the relationship between two dealers and the same 
manufacturer.248
Significantly, many of the restraints that have historically been 
viewed as having a lesser anticompetitive impact are often less 
effective at achieving the procompetitive benefits.249  For example, 
area of primary responsibility clauses have long been touted as less 
restrictive alternatives for exclusive dealerships.250  Both are primarily 
designed to prevent free–riding and to prohibit dealers from 
invading their intrabrand competitors’ territories.251  While exclusive 
dealerships achieve these goals by creating exclusive territories, 
 246. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2722–23.  For example, despite the anticompetitive 
dangers of vertical price restraints, “vertical nonprice restraints may prove less 
efficient for inducing desired services, and they reduce intrabrand competition more 
than vertical price restraints by eliminating both price and service competition.”  Id. 
at 2723.  Professor Handler expressed these concerns in the context of Justice 
Brennan’s concurrence in White Motor:  “If anything, the lesser sanction suggested by 
Mr. Justice Brennan—that of partial profit passovers from one dealer to another—
may be more risky, since this device might conceivably be viewed as a horizontal 
agreement among the dealers themselves.”  Milton Handler, Recent Antitrust 
Developments, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 167 (1963); see also, e.g., William S. Comanor, 
Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Marketing Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 983, 1001 (1985) (explaining that the competitive effects of vertical restraints 
vary from case to case); Karen L. Grimm & David A. Balto, Consumer Pricing for ATM 
Services:  Antitrust Constraints and Legislative Alternatives, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 864–
66 (1993) (discussing the difficulty in determining if various alternatives are more or 
less restrictive); Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints:  A Misunderstood 
Relation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 143, 194 (1997) (noting that “[b]ecause less restrictive 
alternatives are less effective and more costly to implement, a manufacturer’s failure 
to adopt them in no way suggests” that an antitrust violation has been committed). 
 247. See Comanor, supra note 246, at 999–1000 (noting that imposition of vertical 
restraints may decrease consumer welfare for certain consumers). 
 248. See Goldberg, supra note 230, at 110 (discussing the economic impacts of 
different vertical restraints). 
 249. See Meese, supra note 246, at 190 (stating that “very few, if any, of the less 
restrictive alternatives identified . . . are equally as effective as exclusive territories or 
resale price maintenance”). 
 250. See infra notes 252–253 and accompanying text (explaining that although 
area of primary responsibility clauses are less restrictive because they do not require 
absolute exclusivity, they are not as effective as exclusive dealerships). 
 251. See supra note 238 and accompanying text (listing exclusive territories and 
area of primary responsibility clauses as vertical restraints designed to restrict 
intrabrand competition and encourage interbrand competition). 
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primary responsibility clauses are “less restrictive” because they only 
require dealers to use their “best efforts” to promote and sell the 
manufacturer’s product within their given territory.252  The less 
restrictive nature of these clauses, however, also means they will often 
be less effective in eliminating free-riding and preventing invasion of 
territories because a dealer with primary responsibility in one area 
may still be able to do business in another area and free-ride off of its 
competitors.253  Primary responsibility clauses are also more costly and 
more difficult to implement and enforce.  Violations of exclusive 
territories are easy to detect; a competitor may not operate outside of 
its area.  Primary responsibility clauses, however, require a more 
exacting and expensive effort, as the manufacturer must expend the 
time and resources to determine if the dealer has used “best efforts” 
within its primary area before moving on to another territory.254  The 
added cost and complexity may cause the manufacturer to forego any 
attempts to accurately monitor compliance with the areas of primary 
responsibility, thus further diminishing its potential procompetitive 
benefits.255
The relative anticompetitive effects, procompetitive benefits, and 
costs of implementation of the different vertical restraints thus create 
an almost impossible burden for a court applying the New Rule of 
Reason.256  Consider a situation in which a golf club manufacturer, 
lacking any significant market share or market power, decides to 
forego its expansive national advertising campaign and instead 
focuses on local advertising and marketing at the retail level, with an 
emphasis on point-of-sale services and in-store displays and 
demonstrations.  For example, the manufacturer requires that each 
of its dealers provide on-site demonstrations of the golf clubs, an in-
store “driving range,” video swing analysis, and custom fittings for 
each customer, so each consumer gets a uniquely designed set of golf 
 252. See Meese, supra note 197, at 169 (describing primary responsibility clauses as 
a weak alternative to exclusive territories). 
 253. See id. (“The fact that a firm has the primary responsibility for one area does 
not prevent other firms from invading its territory and thus does little to prevent free 
riding.”). 
 254. See id. at 169–70 (describing the difficulty and expense associated with 
enforcing area of primary responsibility clauses because of the vagueness of the 
clauses and potential disagreement between parties).  A similar comparison can be 
made between profit pass-over clauses and exclusive dealerships.  See also Bork, supra 
note 201, at 466 (describing profit pass-over clauses, exclusive dealerships, and area 
of primary responsibility clauses as often being “inadequate or even irrelevant”). 
 255. See Bork, supra note 201, at 467–69 (concluding that area of primary 
responsibility clauses are inadequate because of their expense and difficulty to 
enforce). 
 256. See id. at 466–69 (discussing the inherent problems associated with each 
vertical restraint). 
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clubs.257  To encourage dealers to carry the brand, to prevent free-
riding,258 and to achieve all of the other procompetitive benefits of 
vertical restraints discussed above, the manufacturer chooses to 
employ a minimum resale price maintenance agreement. 
Assume that a terminated golf club dealer brings suit challenging 
the agreement under Section 1 and that the defendant is able to 
show that its resale price maintenance scheme has significant 
procompetitive benefits, minimal anticompetitive effects, and is net 
procompetitive.259  Under the New Rule of Reason, the case is just 
getting started.  The court must now determine the relative net 
competitive effects of the alternative vertical restraints.  Ignoring the 
virtual impossibility of the task,260 assume that the court is able to 
determine the following: 
In terms of procompetitive benefits, the price maintenance 
agreement was the most effective method for protecting the 
company’s brand name and promoting interbrand competition, was 
only marginally successful at preventing free-riding, and had no 
impact on incentivizing new dealers to carry the product.  A 
territorial restriction would have been more effective at preventing 
free-riding and encouraging new dealers to carry the product, but 
less effective at protecting the company’s brand name and promoting 
interbrand competition.  An area of primary responsibility clause 
would have been less effective at accomplishing all of the objectives. 
In terms of anticompetitive effects, the price maintenance 
agreement eliminated intrabrand price competition and served as a 
significant barrier to entry, but did not reduce innovation.  A 
territorial restriction would have eliminated all forms of intrabrand 
competition and reduced innovation, but would not have served as a 
significant barrier to entry.  An area of primary responsibility clause 
would have reduced—but not eliminated—intrabrand competition 
and innovation but would not have served as a significant barrier to 
entry. 
 257. This scenario may seem familiar to owners of Ping golf clubs.  See Brief of 
Ping, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 173680 (discussing 
Ping’s policy of custom fitting golf clubs). 
 258. That is, in this case, to prevent customers from receiving the training, the 
fitting, etc., then walking down the street and buying the clubs at a cheaper price 
from a dealer who does not provide the same level of training and in-store services. 
 259. As would likely be the case where the defendant is just one of many 
competitors in the golf club industry and therefore has no market power and no 
ability to cause any anticompetitive effects in the overall market. 
 260. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the difficulties of applying the less restrictive 
alternative inquiry). 
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Under the New Rule of Reason, the court must now do the very 
thing it is attacked for being unable to do—balance competitive 
effects—multiple times on multiple hypothetical restraints.  Then, 
the court must perform yet another balancing act, this time 
comparing the net effects of the hypothetical restraints against the 
net effects of the actual restraint.  The rule of reason is thus 
transformed from a difficult and costly balancing test into a 
completely unmanageable multi-tiered balancing adventure.  Use of 
the less restrictive alternative inquiry compounds all of the problems 
of the rule of reason test by taking a difficult, complex, costly, 
unpredictable and error-ridden task—balancing the net effects of a 
restraint—and requiring courts to perform it multiple times.261
C. Case Studies 
Although no court of appeals has decided a rule of reason case 
based solely on the existence of a less restrictive alternative, several 
cases help illustrate the misuse of and practical and theoretical 
problems raised by the inquiry.262  For example, in North American 
Soccer League v. National Football League,263 the National Football 
League (“NFL”) instituted a rule preventing its owners from owning a 
share of a team in any other professional sports league, contending 
that the rule was necessary to ensure loyalty to the NFL and to 
prevent disclosure of confidential information to the other 
professional sports leagues.264  The Second Circuit stated that the 
purpose of the rule of reason was to determine “whether the 
procompetitive effects of [the] restraint outweigh the anticompetitive 
effects” and struck down the NFL’s cross-ownership ban after 
determining it was net anticompetitive.265
The court, however, also noted that “in carrying out a rule of 
reason analysis, ‘the existence of [less restrictive] alternatives is 
obviously of vital concern in evaluating putatively anticompetitive 
 261. The additional level of complexity varies with the different inquiries used by 
the different circuits.  See supra notes 104–124 and accompanying text (addressing 
the variety of tests and burden shifting employed by the circuits). 
 262. A disproportionate number of these cases arise in the sports industry, where 
courts have long recognized that some level of cooperation is necessary for the 
product to exist at all.  See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100–02 (1984) 
(describing the importance of cooperation in preserving amateur intercollegiate 
athletics). 
 263. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 264. See id. at 1261 (arguing further that procompetitive effects of the rule 
outweighed any anticompetitive effects). 
 265. Id. at 1259. 
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conduct’”266 and declared that even if the NFL’s restraint were net 
procompetitive, the “NFL was required to come forward with proof 
that any legitimate purposes could not be achieved through less 
restrictive means.”267  The court then gave a brief glimpse of the 
potential misuse of and haphazard post hoc, ad hoc guesswork that is 
invited by the less restrictive alternative inquiry, conjuring up 
alternatives that it claimed were less restrictive yet as effective as the 
NFL’s ownership ban.268  For example, the court speculated that the 
NFL’s legitimate concerns regarding conflicts of interest in the sale of 
broadcast rights and tickets sales could have been remedied by 
removing cross-owners from its broadcast rights committee.269  Putting 
aside the fact that the court offered no evidence that this alternative 
would have been as effective at eliminating broadcast rights conflicts, 
this proposed alternative does not even address half of the NFL’s 
concerns—conflicts of interest with respect to sale of tickets.  Even if 
the proposed alternative had addressed ticket sales, how can a court 
determine the costs and benefits of such a hypothetical solution?  
How can a court compare the costs and benefits of the hypothetical 
solution with the costs and benefits of the actual solution used by the 
NFL?  And, assuming, arguendo, that the NFL’s rule had a net 
procompetitive impact, why should a court spend its time and 
resources attempting to fine-tune what is essentially a business 
decision? 
Similar concerns are raised by Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference,270 
where the University of Washington football team brought an 
antitrust suit against the Pacific 10 Conference (“Pac-10”) after the 
team and its star quarterback, Billy Joe Hobert, were punished by the 
Pac-10 for committing numerous National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (“NCAA”) violations.271  The Ninth Circuit recognized 
that the punishment—which included a two-year ban on the team 
from bowl game participation, as well as a limit on the number of 
football scholarships the school could offer—had anticompetitive 
effects but concluded that the sanctions had a net procompetitive 
effect in that they protected the integrity of college football and the 
 266. See id. (quoting Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 303 
(2d Cir. 1979) (alteration in original). 
 267. Id. at 1261. 
 268. See id. (noting that the NFL failed to show that its purpose could not be 
achieved through less restrictive alternatives). 
 269. Id. 
 270. 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 271. See id. at 1317 (violations included Hobert receiving $50,000 in loans). 
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NCAA.272  Nevertheless, the court noted that the sanctions would have 
violated the rule of reason if the plaintiffs had shown that the 
procompetitive benefits could have been achieved in a less restrictive 
manner, such as through lighter sanctions.273
Although the plaintiffs failed to meet this burden, the analysis 
suggested in the opinion is troubling.  The NCAA disciplinary rules at 
issue in Hairston have significant and important procompetitive 
benefits and the Supreme Court has long recognized that the NCAA 
“needs ample latitude” to regulate collegiate sports.274  The 
anticompetitive effects incurred by the players who are punished 
pursuant to these rules, in contrast, are minimal.  The balancing test 
is therefore simple:  the procompetitive benefits far outweigh the 
anticompetitive effects.  Yet, the Hairston approach invites plaintiffs 
and judges to second-guess and tinker with the NCAA’s authority to 
govern itself.  If a player had been suspended for eight games, is it up 
to a court to decide if seven would have been sufficient?  If a team was 
stripped of three of its scholarships, would two have been good 
enough?  How can a trier of fact make these determinations with any 
confidence or accuracy?  And, why are we asking judges to even 
address these questions? 
District courts have seized on the invitation to engage in the 
dangerous second-guessing invited by the circuit courts.  In Clarett v. 
National Football League,275 Maurice Clarett challenged the NFL’s rule 
limiting eligibility for its entry draft to players who were at least three 
full seasons removed from high school graduation.276  According to 
the NFL, it enacted the rule to protect younger players from the 
physical and mental damage they would incur in the NFL when 
playing against older, stronger, more experienced professional 
players.277  Judge Scheindlin held that the rule violated Section 1 for 
two independent reasons:  First, its anticompetitive effects 
outweighed the (virtually non-existent) procompetitive benefits; 
second, even if the procompetitive benefits outweighed the 
anticompetitive effects, the benefits could have been achieved by less 
restrictive alternatives.278  In discussing the less restrictive alternatives, 
 272. See id. at 1319 (noting that the punishment was not disproportionate to those 
that had been allowed in the past and that, under the rule of reason, it resulted in 
more procompetitive effects). 
 273. Id. 
 274. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984). 
 275. 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev’d in part and vacated in part, 369 F.3d 
124 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 276. Id. at 382. 
 277. Id. at 387. 
 278. Id. at 409–10. 
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Judge Scheindlin noted that age was a “poor proxy for NFL-
readiness” because players develop physically and emotionally at 
different ages.279  According to the judge, comprehensive individual 
medical examinations would have been a less restrictive alternative 
and “better” method for evaluating the physical and mental fitness of 
high school athletes—“[i]n such a scenario, no player would be 
automatically excluded from the market and each team could decide 
what level of risk it is willing to tolerate.”280
Again, the less restrictive alternative inquiry shifted the focus off of 
the competitive effects of the restraint and onto the judge’s ability to 
conjure up less restrictive alternatives.  And, again, the judge offered 
an alternative that, even on its face, failed to adequately meet the 
defendant’s stated objectives.  The reason for the rule was to protect 
the welfare of athletes by preventing teams from drafting players who 
were not “NFL-ready.”  The judge’s alternative removes this very 
protection by allowing each team to use its discretion in determining 
a player’s NFL-readiness.281  Even if the judge had suggested a system 
that removed the discretion from the individual teams and therefore 
superficially met the goals of the NFL, what evidence is there that a 
test could be created to distinguish the fit from the unfit?  How much 
would the tests cost?  If the NFL used such tests, could the plaintiff 
then offer proof that there were better, faster, or less expensive 
tests?282  More importantly, what does any of this have to do with the 
competitive effects of the rule? 
The misuse of the inquiry is further highlighted by McNeil v. 
National Football League,283 where a group of NFL players brought an 
antitrust claim against the NFL’s right of first refusal or 
compensation rules (“Plan B Rules”), claiming that the rules 
 279. Id. at 410. 
 280. Id. 
 281. See id. (theorizing that each team could decide for itself how much liability it 
was willing to incur by drafting young players). 
 282. Similarly, in United States v. Brown University, the Department of Justice 
brought a Section 1 claim against a financial aid system implemented by MIT and 
eight Ivy League schools.  805 F. Supp. 288, 289 (E.D. Pa. 1992) rev’d, 5 F.3d 658 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  Pursuant to the system, each school agreed that it would only give 
financial aid on the basis of “demonstrated need,” rather than merit, and shared 
financial information to set a uniform level of financial aid.  Id. at 293.  The schools 
claimed the purpose of the system was to provide needy students with financial aid, 
because absent the restrictions the schools would attempt to outbid each other for 
the highest achieving students, leaving no financial aid for the students in need.  Id. 
at 304–05.  The district court invalidated the system, concluding, inter alia, that any 
benefits of the system could have been achieved by less restrictive alternatives.  See id. 
at 306 (asserting, in part, that if the institutions are actually serious about needy 
students then they will find another way to achieve their goal).  Notably, the court 
offered no support for this conclusion other than sheer speculation. 
 283. No. 4–90–476, 1992 WL 315292 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1992). 
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unreasonably restrained the movement of NFL players after their 
contracts expired.284  The court concluded that, regardless of the 
actual procompetitive benefits, the Plan B Rules violated the antitrust 
laws unless the NFL could prove that the benefits could not have 
been achieved through a less restrictive alternative.285  Significantly, 
the presence of less restrictive alternatives was to be determined by 
comparing the NFL’s player restraint system with systems used by 
other professional sports leagues.286  Thus, under the New Rule of 
Reason’s less restrictive alternative standard, the NFL was in violation 
of the antitrust laws unless it could show that its rules were as effective 
as the rules of its competitors.287  Hinging legality on the relative 
efficiency of a firm’s competitors simply does not make sense and is 
divorced from any sensible interpretation of the antitrust laws.  The 
laws were designed to ferret out net anticompetitive conduct, not to 
punish firms for failing to be as efficient as their competition. 
IV. THE LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE INQUIRY FAILS  
AS A HEURISTIC 
Although it is clear that use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry 
as an additional prong of the rule of reason is both theoretically and 
practically flawed, the question still remains whether the inquiry can 
be used as a heuristic for the Board Rule of Reason.288  Heuristics are 
powerful tools that are used frequently in economics to provide 
economists with presumptions and shortcuts to simplify complex 
theoretical issues.289  The key feature of a heuristic is that it must be 
capable of “actually making or recommending decisions, taking as 
their inputs the kinds of empirical data that are available in the real 
world.”290  A heuristic “replace[s] abstract, global goals with tangible 
subgoals, whose achievement can be observed and measured.”291  
Heuristics therefore serve as rules of thumb, and are able to reduce 
 284. Id. at *1. 
 285. Id. at *5.  The test becomes even more unfair when the burden is placed on 
the defendant, as it essentially requires the defendant to prove a negative.  That is, to 
prove the absence of any less restrictive alternatives. 
 286. Id. 
 287. See id. (instructing the jury to consider whether other professional sport 
leagues were more “competitively balanced”). 
 288. As discussed at length above, the Addyston test cannot replace the Chicago 
Board of Trade test because the two tests serve very different purposes.  See supra Part 
III.A. 
 289. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 185, at 215 (discussing use of heuristics and 
their ability to simplify an inquiry). 
 290. Simon, supra note 134, at 498. 
 291. Id. at 501. 
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the cost and complexity of analysis and increase the certainty and 
predictability of results.292
The Chicago Board of Trade test would appear to be ideally suited for 
a heuristic, as its balancing test is constantly criticized for requiring 
the identification of abstract, global goals—competition, 
procompetitive, anticompetitive—that are difficult to quantify and 
weigh.  Commentators have therefore proposed a number of 
different heuristics, including the Addyston test,293 all designed to 
minimize the complexity of the Board Rule of Reason.294  While the 
merits of these other heuristics are beyond the scope of this Article,295 
it appears that the proponents of the Addyston test296 have overstated 
its simplicity and that the theoretical and practical flaws of the less 
restrictive alternative inquiry are fatal to the inquiry’s use as a 
heuristic for the Board Rule of Reason.297
 292. See, e.g., Peter Nealis, Note, Per Se Legality:  A New Standard in Antitrust 
Adjudication under the Rule of Reason, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 375–80 (2000) (admitting 
that use of heuristics could have significant benefits, including greater efficiency, but 
postulating that there would be some drawbacks as well). 
 293. Commentators have proposed a number of different variations of the 
Addyston test to serve as a heuristic for the Board Rule of Reason.  These have been 
referred to as, inter alia, an ancillary restraints test, a functional analysis, and the 
Addyston test.  All of these tests have the same key characteristic—use of some form of 
a less restrictive alternative test—as described above.  See, e.g., Thomas Piraino, Jr., 
Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 685, 688–89 (1991) (arguing that an ancillary restraints test, instead of the Board 
Rule of Reason, would simplify the litigation process). 
 294. See, e.g., Peter Carstensen & Bette Roth, The Per Se Legality of Some Naked 
Restraints:  A (Re)Conceptualization of the Antitrust Analysis of Cartelistic Organizations, 45 
ANTITRUST BULL. 349, 368–69 (2000) (arguing for a heuristic that identifies some 
naked restraints as legal per se as a result of public authorization); Easterbrook, supra 
note 70, at 14, 17 (“Courts should use the economists’ way out.  They should adopt 
some simple presumptions that structure antitrust inquiry . . . .  The task, then, is to 
create simple rules that will filter the category of probably-beneficial practices out of 
the legal system, leaving to assessment under the Rule of Reason only those with 
significant risks of competitive injury.”); Daniel Ferrel McInnis, Editor’s Note, 
Symposium:  The Application of Empirical Economics to Antitrust, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 265, 
265–66 (2007) (discussing the use of econometrics in antitrust analysis and 
emphasizing that when properly applied econometrics can filter evidence into an 
understandable and legally applicable form). 
 295. For commentary and criticism of these various heuristics, see, e.g., 
Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 17–34 (suggesting some helpful heuristics in antitrust 
analysis); Richard S. Markovitz, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust:  A Reply to Professor 
Easterbrook, 63 TEX. L. REV. 41, 78 (1984) (criticizing some of Easterbrook’s 
heuristics). 
 296. See, e.g., Carstensen, supra note 32, at 10 (arguing that an Addyston ancillary 
restraints test could potentially determine whether challenged conduct was 
anticompetitive). 
 297. As early as 1918, scholars recognized the difficulty of creating a heuristic for 
Section 1 cases: 
To develop a just, reasonable and practicable construction of the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act and apply it to the complicated facts of our industrial and 
commercial structure is not a simple task.  No rule of thumb, no test capable 
of easy and instant application to every situation, could either work justice or 
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Even assuming, arguendo, that the less restrictive alternative 
inquiry were capable of reaching determinations consistent with the 
goals of the Sherman Act,298 the Addyston test is inapt as an effective or 
appropriate heuristic for the Board Rule of Reason because it does 
not provide tangible or easily observable measures or subgoals.  In 
other words, it is not a true shortcut.  Under the Addyston test, an 
ancillary restraint—one collateral to a legitimate agreement—is 
reasonable if the restraint is reasonably necessary for the underlying 
legitimate agreement to exist at all.299  Though this test was relatively 
simple to perform when applied to covenants not to compete, the 
perceived simplicity of the Addyston approach disappears when 
actually applied to complex restraints.300
Much of the criticism of the Board test focuses on the difficulty of 
defining competition and the complexity of identifying and 
comparing the competitive effects of an agreement.301  In most cases, 
however, the less restrictive alternative inquiry does little (if anything) 
to reduce or avoid this complexity, because the inquiry itself is a 
comparative test that requires an equally precise definition of 
competition and more complex balancing.  The cure, therefore, may 
be worse than the disease. 
Under the Addyston test, a court must determine as a threshold 
matter whether the restraint is naked or is ancillary to some other 
legitimate activity.302  This initial determination, as even proponents 
of Addyston–type tests concede, can be onerous and may be the 
“Achilles heel” of this approach.303  Though couched in terms of 
 
secure the economic ends for which the act was passed.  The test of legality 
must first be expressed in broad general terms, like the act itself; it must 
then be applied with painstaking study and discrimination to the facts of 
each case, bearing always in mind the clear general purpose of the act; the 
border-line between lawful and unlawful must be pricked out; point by point, 
as specific cases arise. 
Negotiability and the Renvoi Doctrine, supra note 59, at 1060–61. 
 298. See supra Part III.A (summarizing negative effects of inquiry upon litigants 
and the courts). 
 299. See supra text accompanying note 33 (explaining the reasonableness of a 
restraint depends upon the purpose of the underlying contract to which it is 
ancillary). 
 300. See supra notes 194–196 and accompanying text (discussing practical 
difficulties courts will encounter in conducting the test). 
 301. See supra notes 200, 202 and accompanying text (providing examples of such 
criticism). 
 302. See, e.g., Carstensen, supra note 32, at 10 (noting that although separating 
ancillary from naked restraints may be difficult, or in some cases impossible, it 
should be attempted in order to examine the scope of the legal restraint). 
 303. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 66, at 376 (noting that courts need help defining 
the lawful dealings to which there are ancillary restraints); see also, e.g., STEPHEN F. 
ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 122 (1993) (“Significant disagreements will, of 
course, arise in defining what constitutes a ‘lawful purpose.’”); Carstensen, supra note 
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requiring only an underlying “legitimate agreement,” the 
ancillary/naked distinction requires courts to define competition and 
identify competitive effects to distinguish between a procompetitive 
(or “legitimate”) agreement and an anticompetitive (or 
“illegitimate”) one.304  Given the lack consensus over a definition of 
competition, there is widespread disagreement as to what actually 
constitutes a procompetitive or legitimate agreement for purposes of 
the Addyston approach.305  This initial task is even more demanding 
because every ancillary restraint is simultaneously pro- and 
anticompetitive,306 as ancillary restraints restrict in order to achieve 
some other legitimate procompetitive goal.  Further, parties often 
camouflage naked restraints as ancillary or procompetitive 
agreements.307  The Addyston test therefore does not absolve courts of 
the difficult task of deciphering the elusive meaning of competition 
and of distinguishing the procompetitive from the anticompetitive. 
Assuming that a court is able to determine that the restraint is 
ancillary to a legitimate objective, the next step is to determine if 
there are any less restrictive alternatives for achieving such an 
objective.  This step requires courts to identify and compare the 
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the challenged 
restraint and its alternatives.308  An alternative restraint is only less 
restrictive if it is less anticompetitive than the restraint at issue while 
 
32, at 10 (admitting that mixed naked and ancillary restraints may be difficult to 
analyze); Carstensen & Roth, supra note 294, at 357 (“Restraints that might be either 
naked or ancillary can be called arguably ancillary restraints.  In order to classify 
them unambiguously, a court must take detailed evidence about the economic 
context in which the restraint operated and weigh the alternative 
characterizations.”). 
 304. See, e.g., Piraino, supra note 293, at 688 (“[A]ncillary restraints . . . are 
generally legal because they are intended to implement the pro-competitive purpose 
of an underlying cooperative arrangement . . . [but] naked restraints . . . should be 
deemed illegal on their face because they are unrelated to any such purpose.”). 
 305. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.  Compare Arthur, supra note 66, 
at 378–79 (arguing that a legitimate agreement must be limited to agreements that 
involve economic integration and voluntary exchange), with Piraino, supra note 293, 
at 725–26 (arguing that a legitimate agreement must be a “true efficiency-enhancing 
integration,” and should be one “that benefit[s] consumers”). 
 306. This is true at least to the extent that all agreements restrain trade.  See supra 
note 46 and accompanying text. 
 307. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 66, at 378 (“The tricky part is that even a naked 
cartel restraint can be characterized as ‘ancillary’ to some supposedly beneficial 
purpose . . . .”); Carstensen & Roth, supra note 294, at 357, 416 (analyzing an 
argument that a lawful purpose can cure an otherwise unlawful restraint). 
 308. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 197, at 477 (arguing that legality under Section 1 is 
determined by comparing the competitive effects of the challenged restraint versus 
the competitive effects of its alternatives); supra notes 199–200 and accompanying 
text. 
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at the same time achieving the same procompetitive benefits.309  
While this task may have been simple when comparing the pro- and 
anticompetitive effects of covenants not to compete, it is remarkably 
complex (if not impossible) when comparing the competitive impact 
of an exclusive dealership versus an area of primary responsibility 
clause or other vertical restraints that perhaps could have been used, 
but were not.310  The Addyston test and its less restrictive alternative 
inquiry therefore replaces the complex balancing test of the Board 
Rule of Reason analysis with its own complex, multi-leveled balancing 
test.311  Moreover, while the Board test rarely requires any precise 
balancing,312 the less restrictive alternative inquiry demands precision 
because courts are required to distinguish between often-similarly 
pro- and anticompetitive restraints. 
An additional problem inherent in the Addyston approach is the 
difficulty of proving causation and of accounting for the impact of 
exogenous factors.313  That is, how can one determine with any 
confidence if a restraint actually caused specific procompetitive 
benefits and anticompetitive effects?  Additionally, how can one 
determine if an alternative restraint would have caused similar (or 
greater or lesser) competitive effects?  Causation issues cloud not only 
the comparative or balancing component of the Addyston test, but 
also the threshold ancillary/naked distinction, where courts are asked 
to decide whether a restraint furthers a legitimate goal. 
The key measures of the Addyston test, the relative competitive 
effects, are thus no more easily measurable or identifiable than the 
key measures of the Chicago Board of Trade test.314  Creation of 
 309. See supra notes 211–214 and accompanying text.  Of course, there is no clarity 
as to how this determination is to be made. 
 310. See supra Part IV.B. 
 311. See supra notes 302, 308 and accompanying text (describing the two-part 
Addyson test as:  (1) identifying whether the restraint was naked or ancillary and  
(2) determining whether there was a less restrictive alternative available). 
 312. See discussion supra note 71. 
 313. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 134, at 502 (discussing the limits of choosing the 
optimal alternative).  Granted, these problems also infect the Chicago Board of Trade 
test, but the less restrictive alternative test does little to avoid or solve these problems 
and therefore is not an effective heuristic. 
 314. Several variations of the Addyston test have been proposed to make the task 
easier to perform by relaxing the less restrictive alternative requirement.  For 
example, Professor Roberts argues that ancillary restraints that are “reasonably 
related”—not reasonably necessary—to a lawful purpose should be legal.  Roberts, 
supra note 41, at 1010; see also Arthur, supra note 66, at 380 (arguing that a less 
restrictive alternative inquiry should not should be used and courts should instead 
look at whether the restraint was reasonably necessary).  Although a critique of all of 
these variations is beyond the scope of this Article, the relaxed versions of the test, 
while easier to perform, may fall short of protecting the goals of the antitrust laws (to 
the extent they can be identified) by failing to provide a sufficient check on the 
anticompetitive effects of the challenged restraint.  See id. at 383 (noting that a 
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heuristics to simplify the Chicago Board of Trade analysis is a worthy 
goal, and scientific, mathematic, and econometric models should be 
incorporated into antitrust law to identify shortcuts to streamline the 
rule of reason analysis.  The Addyston test does not streamline the 
analysis and its use as a heuristic therefore makes little sense. 
V. THE PROPER ROLE OF THE LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE 
INQUIRY:  TO PROVE INTENT 
This is not to say that proof of the existence of less restrictive 
alternatives is irrelevant to the Rule of Reason.  Such proof, however, 
is directly related to the intent of the agreement, not its effect.  Proof 
that a restraint is overly restrictive (i.e., that less restrictive alternatives 
exist) allows for the presumption that the purpose of the restraint is 
not to achieve the procompetitive goal.315  After all, if achievement of 
the procompetitive goal were the true purpose of the restraint, why 
not employ the less restrictive alternative?  In other words, one can 
presume that a firm will use the most efficient—i.e., least restrictive—
methods available to it.  If the firm fails to use the most efficient 
methods to achieve its legitimate goals, one can presume that it did 
not intend to actually achieve those goals.  Instead, the legitimate 
goals served as a pretext to cover the true anticompetitive purpose of 
the restraint.316  The intent of the agreement can then be used to help 
prove its competitive effects.317  Since 1918 and Chicago Board of Trade, 
 
reasonably necessary-type ancillary restraints test may be too defendant-friendly and 
lead to false negatives); Ross, supra note 197, at 491–92 (arguing that the reasonably 
related test suggested by Professor Roberts is unlikely to prohibit any joint activity).  
A less restrictive alternative test that is relatively easy to perform and is used as an aid 
in determining net competitive effects, however, may be a useful heuristic for 
judging the legality of certain types of agreements. 
 315. See, e.g., Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1573, 1577 
n.31 (11th Cir. 1983) (accepting that a less restrictive alternative analysis is useful to 
indicate the motive of the defendant); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire 
Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750, 758 (D. Md. 1980), aff’d, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting 
that the less restrictive alternative requirement is useful to “illuminate the true 
purpose of a restriction”); see also, e.g., BORK, supra note 27, at 36–37 (“Bad intent can 
be shown by . . . the employment of abusive or predatory practices, or by other 
behavior inconsistent with efficiency.”); Ross, supra note 216, at 91 (noting that 
courts can infer anticompetitive intent from unnecessarily restrictive agreements 
because “parties do not ordinarily enter into overly broad agreements for the 
purpose of achieving narrower legitimate results”). 
 316. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 27, at 38 (“If efficiency would have produced 
comparable results, why resort to such practices?”); Sykes, supra note 163, at 419 
(recognizing the existence of the argument that “the least restrictive means 
analysis . . . is political cover for motive review”). 
 317. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 
602–03 (1985) (explaining that anticompetitive intent can be probative of the 
legality of the transaction); see infra notes 342–343, 345 and accompanying text. 
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this is the only manner in which the Supreme Court has used proof 
of less restrictive alternatives in the rule of reason context. 
For example, in his concurrence in White Motor, Justice Brennan 
limited the use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry to providing 
an inference of anticompetitive intent.318  According to Justice 
Brennan, the existence of a less restrictive alternative did not prove 
that the restraint employed was, by definition, anticompetitive, and it 
was not determinative in the rule of reason analysis.319  Rather, 
“presence [of a less restrictive alternative] invite[d] suspicion either 
that dealer pressures rather than manufacturer interests brought it 
about, or that the real purpose of its adoption was to restrict price 
competition.”320
The Supreme Court confirmed this limited role of the less 
restrictive alternative inquiry over forty years later in Leegin, when it 
overruled the per se rule against minimum resale price maintenance 
agreements.321  The Court recognized that these price maintenance 
agreements may have significant net procompetitive benefits for both 
the consumers and the manufacturer instituting the restraint.322  Net 
anticompetitive effects were only likely (or at least significantly more 
likely) in cases where it appeared that the price maintenance 
agreements were being imposed by the dealers, not the 
manufacturers.  In those cases, the agreements were more akin to 
horizontal price fixing agreements, which typically lead to higher 
prices and lower output and are per se illegal.323
In its analysis, the Court recognized that proof of the existence of 
less restrictive alternatives to the vertical resale price maintenance 
agreements could be relevant to showing that the restrictions were 
implemented at the insistence of the dealers.324  After all, if the 
manufacturer had a more efficient method available for achieving 
 318. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 270-72 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (stating that the presence of less restrictive alternatives could give an 
inference of intent but that the district court would need to make a finding of fact on 
the issue). 
 319. Id. at 270–72 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that there would have to be 
a negative effect on competition). 
 320. Id. at 270 n.9 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Carstensen, supra note 
32, at 62 (“Unduly restrictive ‘regulation’ makes rational economic sense only if the 
parties are also seeking to ‘suppress’ competition among themselves in order to gain 
added cartelistic benefits.”); Meese, supra note 197, at 168 (“To be sure, proof that 
defendants could have adopted a less restrictive and less effective restraint is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the restraint exercises or creates market power, 
and that the benefits it creates coexist with anticompetitive harm.”). 
 321. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2715–16 
(2007). 
 322. Id. at 2714–15. 
 323. See id. at 2717 (discussing cases involving horizontal price fixing). 
 324. Id. at 2717–29. 
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the net procompetitive benefits, why use the less efficient resale price 
maintenance agreement?  The answer to that question, and the 
presumption drawn, was that the vertical restraints in such cases were 
simply pretext to hide the fact that the dealers had insisted on the 
resale price maintenance agreement in furtherance of a horizontal 
price fixing agreement.325  Existence of less restrictive alternatives was 
therefore not used to prove the anticompetitive effect of the restraint, 
but instead to permit an inference of anticompetitive intent.326
The Supreme Court also used the existence of less restrictive 
alternatives strictly as proof of pretext and intent in NCAA v. Board of 
Regents,327 the landmark case where a group of schools with high-
profile football programs successfully challenged the NCAA’s attempt 
to limit the number of times each school’s games appeared on 
television.328  Pursuant to the NCAA’s plan, individual schools were 
not permitted to sell television rights to their games.329  The NCAA 
instead entered into a national television contract that permitted the 
broadcast of only twenty-eight total college football games per year.330  
Each school could be televised no more than six times in two years, 
and the networks had to televise the games of at least eighty-two 
different colleges every two years.331
The NCAA argued that the television plan was procompetitive 
because, inter alia, it maintained competitive balance and preserved 
the “academic tradition” that distinguished college football from 
professional football.332  The Supreme Court recognized that both of 
these were legitimate procompetitive goals and acknowledged that 
the “NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve 
its character, and as a result enables a product to be marketed which 
might otherwise be unavailable.”333  The Court then identified a 
number of other rules and restraints that more effectively achieved 
these procompetitive benefits.334  With respect to the maintenance of 
competitive balance, the Court noted that regulations on recruiting 
and limitations on the number of coaches and players per team, as 
 325. Id. at 2719. 
 326. Id. 
 327. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 328. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984). 
 329. Id. at 94. 
 330. Id. at 92–93. 
 331. Id. at 94. 
 332. Id. at 101–02. 
 333. Id. at 102.  The Supreme Court explained that by “performing this role, [the 
NCAA’s] actions widen consumer choice—not only the choices available to sports 
fans but also those available to athletes—and hence can be viewed as 
procompetitive.”  Id. 
 334. Id. at 119. 
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well as restrictions on alumni donations and any other sources of 
revenue, were all better (or equally effective) alternatives.335  With 
respect to the preservation of the unique amateur nature of the sport, 
the Court noted that restrictions on payments to players and 
eligibility requirements were more effective options.336
Significantly, the Court did not find that the NCAA’s television 
plan was illegal because of the existence of these less restrictive 
alternatives.337  Instead, the Court made clear that the presence of 
these alternatives was relevant only as proof that the procompetitive 
justifications for the restriction were merely pretext, and that the real 
intent and purpose of the restriction was to reduce output and raise 
prices.338  The anticompetitive intent of the restriction was not, 
however, enough to make it illegal.  Rather, the Court invalidated the 
restriction because its anticompetitive effects (lower output and 
higher prices) far outweighed its (virtually non-existent) 
procompetitive benefits.339  The less restrictive alternative inquiry thus 
helped shed light on the intent of the defendant, but it was not 
independently significant of actual anticompetitive effects.340
This is precisely how the less restrictive alternative inquiry is used 
in the tying analysis and in common law restraint of trade cases.  In 
tying cases, the presence of a less restrictive alternative to the tying 
mechanism is used not for proof of the anticompetitive effect of the 
tie, but rather for the inference that the tie was utilized for an illegal 
or anticompetitive purpose.341  Again, the rationale becomes why use 
the tying arrangement if its legitimate goals could be achieved 
through a more efficient method?342  As Professor Turner explained, 
if a less restrictive alternative could perform the same procompetitive 
functions as the tying arrangement, it is “quite reasonable to presume 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. at 119–20. 
 338. Id. at 120. 
 339. Id. at 113. 
 340. This analysis, of course, has also been used in the constitutional law context, 
where the presence of obviously less restrictive alternatives was used to show that the 
purported legitimate goals of a rule or regulation were merely pretext.  See, e.g., 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342–43, 353 (1972) (stating that the fact that a 
waiting period to vote for new residents is obviously unnecessary to further the stated 
governmental interest makes the restriction illegal). 
 341. Supra II.C. 
 342. See, e.g., Turner, Validity, supra note 79, at 64 (explaining that manufacturers 
can achieve their stated goals simply by requiring higher standards of producers of 
the tied product); Arthur H. Travers, Jr. & Thomas D. Wright, Note, Restricted 
Channels of Distribution under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REV. 795, 824, 826 (1962) 
(focusing on the “asserted business justification” and “measuring a legitimate 
business need against the actual agreement to determine whether a less restrictive 
alternative would have sufficed”). 
  
628 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:561 
                                                          
an illegal purpose.”343  And, in the common law restraint of trade 
cases, a less restrictive alternative was not used as proof of 
anticompetitive effect.  Instead, it provided “a justifiable suspicion 
that the actual motives behind the restraint were other than the 
legitimate ones asserted.”344  The presumption was implemented as a 
heuristic for proving anticompetitive intent, not as proof of actual 
anticompetitive impact.345
It is therefore not problematic that the New Rule of Reason gives 
weight to the existence of less restrictive alternatives.  It is 
problematic, however, that courts use their existence as a proxy for a 
finding of net anticompetitive effect.  Such a use is not only 
theoretically and practically flawed,346 but is also contrary to the well-
established role of intent in antitrust cases.  The role of intent in 
antitrust law—and thus the role of proof of less restrictive 
alternatives—is to help interpret and predict the effects of a restraint.  
Evidence of anticompetitive intent is not the equivalent of 
anticompetitive effect.  Intent cannot, by itself, be dispositive of 
actual economic effects.347  Regardless of the intent or purpose of the 
parties, legality in Section 1 cases is determined by the actual 
economic impact of the restraint.348
As the Supreme Court explained in Chicago Board of Trade: 
[T]he reason for adopting the particular remedy[, and] the 
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.  This is 
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable 
 343. Turner, Validity, supra note 79, at 64; see also id. at 62 (stating that if a less 
restrictive alternative could have achieved the legitimate function of the tying 
arrangement, “it is a reasonable assumption that the purpose of the seller in using a 
tie-in is to restrain competition”). 
 344. Travers & Wright, supra note 342, at 824. 
 345. See, e.g., Covenants, supra note 36, at 509 (noting that courts use a less 
restrictive alternative test as an easy way of finding the primary purpose of the 
restraint); see also, e.g., United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 208 F. 733, 742 (N.D. 
Ohio 1913) (“The fact that the restraint of competition was not limited to the locality 
where the seller was doing business . . . tends to show an intention on the part of the 
Towing Company to get more than reasonable protection incidental to the good will 
of the business sold . . . . Such [action], unexplained, justifies a presumption of an 
intent to dominate and control the towing facilities.”). 
 346. See supra Parts II–III. 
 347. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 
(1985) (“[E]vidence of intent is merely relevant to the question whether the 
challenged conduct is fairly characterized as . . . ‘anticompetitive’ . . . .”); Levine v. 
Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 1552 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The rule of 
reason analysis is concerned with the actual or likely effects of defendants’ behavior, 
not with the intent behind that behavior.”). 
 348. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984) (noting that, despite 
proof of the intent of a restraint, “the [Section 1] inquiry is confined to a 
consideration of impact on competitive conditions”) (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l 
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978)). 
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regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may 
help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.349
The underlying theory is that “[a]n anticipated effect on 
competition may be somewhat more likely to have emerged as the 
true effect than an unanticipated effect.”350  Proof of intent therefore 
can play an important role in determining the actual effect of a 
restraint, as it can help a court “judge the likely effects of challenged 
conduct.”351
The less restrictive alternative inquiry should thus be used solely to 
help courts interpret and predict the procompetitive benefits and 
anticompetitive effects of a restraint.  This, of course, is not an 
insignificant task, particularly given the difficulty of identifying with 
precision the competitive effects of a restraint.352  It is, however, a 
much more limited role than contemplated by the New Rule of 
Reason, as it serves as an inference for discerning the effect of a 
restraint instead of a substitute for an actual finding of effect.353  This 
limited use of the inquiry maintains the appropriate focus of the 
antitrust laws on the net effects of the restraint.  It helps courts 
compare the state of the market with the restraint versus without the 
restraint, not, as the New Rule of Reason requires, the state of the 
market with the restraint versus the state of the market with 
alternative restraints.  In cases where predictive and interpretive 
assistance is unnecessary, proof of the intent of the defendant should 
play no role.  Thus, in cases where the actual procompetitive benefits 
of a restraint clearly outweigh its anticompetitive effects, the presence 
of less restrictive alternatives should be irrelevant. 
 349. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also K.M.B. 
Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Intent 
is relevant to the reasonableness inquiry, but only to ‘help courts interpret the 
effects’ of defendants’ actions.”) (citing New York v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811 F. 
Supp. 848, 874 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)); United States Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, 
Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 596 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that “effects are . . . the central 
concern of the antitrust laws,” and that intent is but “a clue”); Nw. Power Prods., Inc. 
v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (“An evil intent alone is 
insufficient to establish a violation under the rule of reason, although proof of intent 
may help a court assess the market impact of the defendants’ conduct.”). 
 350. Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 719 F.2d 207, 225 (7th Cir. 1983); see also id. (“In 
ascertaining effect or consequence, it is useful to determine the setting in which the 
restraint was adopted and the effect or consequence which its instigators 
anticipated.”). 
 351. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 672 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 352. Courts therefore rely on certain shortcuts, such as market power, to help with 
the determination.  See supra notes 289–294 and accompanying text. 
 353. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating 
that “‘smoking gun’ evidence of an intent to restrain competition remains relevant to 
the court’s task of discerning the competitive consequences of a defendant’s 
actions”). 
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For example, in Hairston, the procompetitive benefits of the NCAA 
disciplinary decision far outweighed its anticompetitive effects.354  Yet, 
under the New Rule of Reason, evidence that a less restrictive 
disciplinary measure would have achieved the same procompetitive 
benefits could have been used to invalidate the NCAA’s decision.  
Under any reasonable interpretation of Chicago Board of Trade and its 
Supreme Court progeny, invalidation of the NCAA’s action would be 
the wrong result.  The presence of less restrictive alternatives to the 
NCAA’s decision does not convert it from net procompetitive to net 
anticompetitive.  Thus, regardless of the intent of the NCAA—good, 
bad, or indifferent—its action is still clearly net procompetitive and 
legal.  As Professor Areeda has stated, “an admitted intention to limit 
competition will not make illegal conduct that we know to be pro-
competitive or otherwise immune from antitrust control.”355  Evidence 
of less restrictive alternatives should therefore be irrelevant. 
Use of the existence of less restrictive alternatives to permit an 
inference of anticompetitive intent instead of as a proxy for net 
anticompetitive effect better reflects the practical problems inherent 
in asking judges and juries to differentiate small incremental 
differences in competitive effects.356  Given the difficulties judges have 
identifying and comparing competitive impact with any accuracy or 
precision, it is illogical to hinge the legality of a net procompetitive 
restraint on a finding that a hypothetical alternative is less restrictive.  
If used as just one factor in the overall analysis, the dangers of the 
errors are minimized.  A false positive—that is, an erroneous finding 
that an alternative is less restrictive—should not be outcome-
determinative when errors are likely and unavoidable.  This is 
particularly true in cases, such as Hairston, where a court has already 
determined that the net effects of the restraint are overwhelmingly 
procompetitive.357
Clear evidence that significantly less restrictive alternatives were 
available would allow for a strong inference of anticompetitive intent 
and would have a potentially significant role in discerning net 
 354. Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting 
that the penalties imposed were less severe than would have been acceptable); see 
supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
 355. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 224 F.3d at 948 (quoting 7 PHILIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 
§ 1506 (1986)); see also Jorde & Teece, supra note 151, at 618 (“[T]he existence of an 
obvious and substantially less restrictive alternative may be a factor considered in 
overall rule of reason balancing, but it should not be elevated to a separate stage of 
analysis nor be available as a ‘trump card.’”). 
 356. See supra Part III.A (explaining the difficulties courts encounter in applying 
the New Rule of Reason). 
 357. Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319. 
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competitive effects.358  Evidence of the availability of slightly less 
restrictive alternatives, however, would be given little weight and play 
little or no role in the determination of net effects, because, as the 
Ninth Circuit has noted, “ambiguous indications of intent do not 
help us predict [the] consequences [of a defendant’s acts] and are 
therefore of no value to a court analyzing a restraint under the rule 
of reason, where the court’s ultimate role is to determine the net 
effects of those acts.”359  Regardless of the strength of the evidence, its 
use would be properly limited to aiding in the determination of the 
economic impact of the restraint. 
Proof of less restrictive alternatives should therefore be used only 
in situations where it can actually assist a court in determining the net 
competitive effect of the restraint in question.  In most cases, courts 
are rarely required to engage in any precise balancing because the 
challenged restraint is either clearly pro- or anticompetitive.360  In 
cases where there is equally strong or weak evidence of both pro and 
anticompetitive impact, or where the economic impact is difficult 
determine, the existence of less restrictive alternatives can play a 
significant role in helping a court interpret and predict the impact of 
the restraint and serve as a tiebreaker.361  Proof of less restrictive 
alternatives can also be used to support or confirm the evidence of 
actual economic effects.  This is precisely how the Supreme Court 
used the existence of the less restrictive alternatives in NCAA.362  In 
such cases, it is not a question of searching for a more efficient 
alternative as a proxy for a finding of net anticompetitiveness.  
Instead, the inquiry is simply a means to aid a court in predicting, 
 358. Thus, a grossly overly restrictive restraint (one that no “reasonable 
businessperson” would employ) would likely be judged illegal—not because of intent 
alone, but because of the strong inference of anticompetitive effect. 
 359. Cal. Dental, 224 F.3d at 948 (quotation omitted). 
 360. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 361. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n, 224 F.3d at 948 (discussing “the well-established 
pattern of the Supreme Court to examine intent only in those close cases where the 
plaintiff falls short of proving that the defendant’s actions were anticompetitive”); 
Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953) (reasoning that 
unlawful intent can make an otherwise reasonable restraint unreasonable).  As the 
Second Circuit noted: 
Distinguishing between efficient and predatory conduct is extremely difficult 
because it is frequently the case that ‘[c]ompetitive and exclusionary 
conduct look alike.’  Evidence of intent and effect helps the trier of fact to 
evaluate the actual effect of challenged business practices in light of the 
intent of those who resort to such practices. 
U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1359 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(citation omitted). 
 362. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984) (holding that the 
evidence that less restrictive alternatives would preserve the integrity of the college 
football and would increase output meant that the NCAA’s restrictions were 
anticompetitive); see also supra notes 333–338 and accompanying text. 
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identifying, and interpreting the net impact of a restraint that 
simultaneously presents strong anticompetitive effects and 
procompetitive benefits. 
The New Rule of Reason therefore misuses the less restrictive 
alternative inquiry and fundamentally changes the purpose of Section 
1 of the Sherman Act.  The inquiry must be eliminated as a 
dispositive prong and lower courts must return the focus of antitrust 
analysis to the net competitive effects of the restraint. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has highlighted the theoretical and practical flaws of 
using the less restrictive alternative inquiry as an independent and 
dispositive prong of the rule of reason analysis.  The inquiry, which 
has been adopted by each of the federal circuits, has created a new 
rule of reason that is fundamentally inconsistent with the goals of the 
Sherman Act and is virtually impossible to perform.  The search for 
less restrictive alternatives should play a more limited role in Section 
1 scrutiny, serving as proof of intent.  This role will help courts 
identify the net competitive effects of restraints and maintain the 
focus of antitrust law on the promotion and protection of 
competition. 
 
